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This quantitative exploratory study surveyed 64 South African clinical psychologists' 
opinions of the insanity defence. Clinical psychologists are increasingly becoming 
meaningful contributors to the judicial process in South Africa with regard to criminal 
incapacity. It is therefore considered important to canvas their opinions. To the author's 
knowledge this is the first research on psychologists' opinions of the defence in South 
Africa, possibly internationally. A standardized Likert scale developed by Skeem and 
Evans-DeCicco (2004) to gauge jury views on the insanity defence in the United States 
was used as the data collection tool. This research employed an overall correlational 
research design. Due to heterogenous variances the more liberal assumptions of non-
parametric tests were used to extrapolate findings. The bulk of opinion rested in the 
moderate to ambivalent support ranges, with few strongly positive or negative opinions 
of the insanity defence. Significant results suggest that female psychologists, regardless 
of race, showed less support of the insanity defence than their male counterparts. 
Furthermore, those whose primary therapeutic orientation was psychodynamic had less 
support than those who practiced other modalities. However, a disappointingly small 
sample size and low reliability of the scale makes the generalisability of the results 
tentative, and thus further research is needed to verify these findings. 
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This quantitative research project is an attempt to assess clinical psychologists' opinions 
of the insanity defence in South Africa. It should be noted that the conceptualization of 
insanity over time is not static, but rather characterized by evolving unidirectional 
hypotheses which are influenced by the setting of legal precedents (Burchell & Milton, 
1997) which in turn is informed by psychiatric lore (Parzen, 2003; Reznek, 1997). 
Psychiatric formulations, although enshrined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM), are subject not only to revision but periodic volte-fa 'ce due to 
reformulations of what does and does not constitute mental illness (Reznek, 1997). Thus, 
the DSM paradoxically serves a rigorous gate keeping function which is simultaneously 
malleable over time (Reznek, 1997). 
Moreover, the malleability of conceptions of insanity is further complicated by the 
literature. On the one hand, it is asserted that legal definitions of insanity are not clear cut 
(Kaliski, 2006; Parzen, 2003). On the other hand, psychiatric notions are confounded by 
multiaxial constellations of clinical syndromes, personality disorders, mental retardation 
and important contributing psychosocial issues (Reznek, 1997). These assemblages are 
often untidy, frequently negating neat linear cause and effect relationships in arguing for 
or against responsibility (Belkin, 2003). Moreover, determining responsibility is further 
1 The word opinion has been selected because it refers to "views or sentiments, esp. on moral questions, 
prevalent among people in general" (Sykes, 1978, p. 769). 'Opinion' may at times be used interchangeably 
with attitudes, views or perceptions. 
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complicated by the difficulty in predicting dangerousness in mitigation or aggravation of 
sentencing, more especially with regard to future violent behaviour (Kaliski, 2006). 
Allan and Louw (2001) note that the assessment of fitness to stand trial is traditionally 
the domain of psychiatrists, however, more frequently psychologists are entering the field 
on these and other forensic aspects, such as the state of mind of the accused at the time of 
the offense. Therefore, psychiatric and psychological testimony is necessary in assisting 
the court in deliberating the accused's sanity and, by implication, the sentence (Allan & 
Louw, 2001), be it incarceration or committal to a psychiatric institution. This potentially 
places a complicated ethical burden on the psychologist as committal invariably equates 
to limitless institutionalisation with no parole (Kaliski, 2006), for an accused who may no 
longer be a danger to society (Reznek, 1997). A prison sentence may indeed be a fairer 
disposition as it would be confined to a specified period (Burchell & Milton, 2005). This 
debate becomes even more philosophically complex with contributions from Szasz who 
asserts that mental illness is a misnomer and that the accused should take responsibility 
for their actions (cited in Reznek, 1997). 
Pioneering research on the insanity defence in the United States of America by Skeem 
and Golding (2001) was used as the starting point for this project. This is a nomothetic 
study employing a postal survey of anonymous Likert scale questionnaires developed by 
Skeem and Evans-DeCicco (2004). The sample for this study was derived through 
systematic sampling of clinical psychologists registered with the HPCSA (Health 
Professions Council of South Africa) (Katzenellenbogen, Joubert & Karim, 1999). 
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Completed questionnaires were analysed through descriptive and inferential statistics to 
ascertain relationships between variables from which inferences were made (Durrheim, 
1999a). An overall correlational design combined with non-parametric tests was used to 
engender inferential outcomes. 
To the author's knowledge, this is the first time that research has been done on (clinical) 
psychologists' opinions on the insanity defence in South Africa, and indeed 
internationally. This research is of interest because clinical psychologists are 
increasingly being used as expert witnesses in South Africa and their opinions on the 
insanity defence may have a bearing on their assessments and testimonies. Moreover, in 
an age of international philosophical and ethical deliberations around indefinite 
psychiatric committal (Kaliski, 2006; Reznek, 1997), it is considered important to prompt 




2.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
2.1.1 A brief history of the insanity defence, with an emphasis on South Africa 
Most countries in the modern world have some form of the insanity defence enshrined in 
their legal systems (Parzen, 2003). Although countries in the western world have diverse 
stances on the insanity defence, they have evolved along similar pathways and thus have 
shared histories of thinking about criminal responsibility (Reznek, 1997). It is important 
to note that there are many historical strands to deliberating criminal insanity from the 
Greek philosophers to biblical times, to the Jewish Talmud, which have coalesced to 
what we now know as the insanity defence (Parzen, 2003). 
Under ancient Roman law, offenders were not incarcerated as they were considered 
"punished enough by [their] condition without the law adding to [their] punishment" 
(Prins, 1980, p. 37). Thus, under Roman law, the mentally ill as with young children, 
were doli incapax (lacking criminal capacity) and not held to be responsible for their 
actions (Burchell & Milton, 1997). This precedent was later held by Roman-Dutch law 
(Burchell & Milton, 1997) introduced to South Africa by Van Riebeek circa 1652 (Louw, 
2006). 
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The insanity defence can be traced back to the twelfth century in Europe (Sendor, 1986 
cited in Parzen, 2003). Under early English law the mentally ill offender was convicted 
for his/her crime, but simultaneously pardoned from a death sentence (Reznek, 1997). 
However, prior to 1800 in Britain there were very few institutions for the mentally ill and 
the criminally insane were invariably incarcerated with offenders (Reznek, 1997). 
Though, this was later changed when insane asylums were introduced and the mentally ill 
were 'hospitalised' as opposed to incarcerated (Burchell & Milton, 1997). 
Essentially, early legal formulations allowing for criminal capacity sought to establish 
whether defendants were blameworthy by examining two components: mens rea and 
actus reus (Parzen, 2003). Mens rea refers to the 'evil' intent behind the criminal act, 
and actus reus to the act itself. However, where a defendant is mentally ill the mens rea 
element is compromised because of the impairment in appreciating the wrongfulness of 
one's actions (Burchell & Milton, 1997; Parzen, 2003). 
One of the earliest modern English legal tests for insanity was the "good and evil test" 
{circa 1716) which had its roots in Christian ideology where "... idiots and Lunatics 
[were] not punishable by any criminal prosecution whatsoever" (Hawkins Pleas of the 
Crown cited in Burchell & Milton, 1997, p. 207). The 'good and evil test' was 
superceded by the 'wild beast test' in 1724 (Burchell & Milton, 1997). This was a 
relatively crude measure formulated in R v Arnold: 
... it is not every frantic and idle humour of a man that will exempt him from 
justice and the punishment of the law... [I]t must be a man that is totally 
deprived of understanding and memory and doth not know what he is doing, 
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no more than an infant, than a brute, than a wild beast... (Burchell & Milton, 
1997, p. 207). 
The wild beast test of insanity held sway for just over a century and was surpassed by 
assessing whether the defendant could appreciate the difference between right and wrong 
in 1843 (Burchell & Milton, 1997). This test became known as the M'Naghten Rules and 
was in essence a refinement of the preceding tests in that it was more secular and 
significantly broadened and defined mental illness requisite for an insanity plea: 
(1) Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of 
reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved. 
(2) To establish the defence of insanity, it must be proved that, at the time of 
committing the act the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act; or 
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
(3) A person who labours under a partial delusion only, and is not in other 
respects insane, must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility 
^-as if the facts with respect to which the delusion existed were real (Burchell 
& Milton, 1997, p. 205). 
Thus the M'Naghten Rules acknowledged that insane persons could not be held liable if 
under the influence of a delusion they were unable to appreciate their criminal actions 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005). This rule however had a limitation, as it did not allow for 
those who understood right from wrong but because of their mental illness were unable to 
control their actions (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
Although South African criminal law has its roots in Roman-Dutch law, it too employed 
the English M'Naghten Rules which were later refined to include the 'irresistible impulse 
6 
test' in 1899 which allowed for the conative (volitional) element (Burchell & Milton, 
2005). 
Contemporary "South African criminal law on mental illness arose as a consequence of 
the acquittal of Demitrios Tsafendas, who assassinated the then Prime Minister, Hendrik 
Verwoerd in 1964" (Louw, 2006, p. 40). This led to the Rumpff Commission which 
underpinned the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. The Rumpff Commission asserted that 
personality is made up of a dynamic interplay between the psychological and the 
physical. Moreover, they denoted three integrative categories of healthy mental 
functioning: cognitive, conative (volitional) and affective functions. Disintegration of 
any of these components can lead to lack of insight (cognitive), poor impulse control 
(conative) and inability to regulate emotions (affective) (Louw, 2006). Personality 
impairment or disintegration derives from one or more of these functions breaking down. 
Should this be the case, the person affected cannot be held to be criminally responsible. 
Alternatively, responsibility may be found to be diminished (Louw, 2006). However, 
Louw (2006) stresses that our law recognises incapacity in terms of cognitive and 
conative aspects and not the affective or mood component alone. Moreover, the 
disintegration of the personality refers to a pathological process as opposed to personality 
disorders. 
2.1.2 Early history of psychology and its interaction with the law 
The western world's earliest form of forensic psychology is located with the ancient 
Greeks who philosophically debated the interface between law and psychology (Louw & 
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Allan, 1998). It was the Greeks who delineated the sources of behaviour in psychology 
as opposed to divine intervention or the supernatural. However, although issues such as 
the insanity defence were incorporated into Roman law (Burchell & Milton, 2005), it was 
only in the 19th century that psychology as a discipline began interacting with the law 
(Louw & Allan, 1998). Louw and Allan (1998) note that it was the rise of psychology as 
a rigorous scientific discipline which provided a "unique role in law" (p. 234). 
Moreover, they cite Haward (1981) who details how the psychologist's "role did not 
merely supplement that of the psychiatrist, but was an original and unique function" (p. 
234). 
It has been argued that psychology had its earliest beginnings in shamanism (Finkel, 
1988). Eliade (1964) describes shamans as a "small mystical elite [who] not only directs 
the community's religious life but, as it were, guards its "soul" (cited in Finkel, 1988, p. 
50). Moreover, the shaman is the great specialist in the human soul; he alone "sees" it, 
for he knows its' "form" and its destiny" (Finkel, 1988, p. 50). 
Shamans could either be "extraordinary and sagacious or a charlatan and trickster" 
(Finkel, 1988, p. 50). Moreover, that it was a position of power, as shamans had the 
ability to not only interpret man's psyche, but be highly influential in societies. 
However, divisions arose separating different types of healers who specialized in 
different facets of humankind, on the one hand medical and on the other, the spiritual and 
psychological (Finkel, 1988). Finkel (1988) states that this is the source of disagreement 
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around mind and brain, and the focus on physiological explanations of the medical model 
over more complex psychological explanations. 
It was in 1656 that madness was first incorporated under the physicians' domain in 
Europe with the establishment of the Hospital General, a "semijudicial structure" in Paris 
(Foucault, 1973 cited in Finkel, 1988, p. 51). With the lettres de cachet the King could 
confine without trial or appeal "a new collection of "social marginals": the poor, the 
mendicants, spendthrift fathers, prodigal sons, blasphemers, libertines, criminals, and, 
most of all, the insane" (Finkel, 1988, p. 51). They fell under the purview of physicians 
who, Finkel argues, became the deliberators of "medicine and morality" (p. 51). 
Foucault (1973 cited in Finkel, 1988) notes that the shift from the Renaissance to the Age 
of Reason had the outcome of 'madness' becoming institutionalized and thus, silenced. 
Previously, during the Renaissance, there was much debate around insanity which largely 
dissipated under new ideologies: 
In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates 
with the madman.. .the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, 
thereby authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of 
disease... The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about 
madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence (Foucault, 
1973 pp. x-xi cited in Finkel, 1988, p. 51). 
Indeed, the morality of the time dictated that those committed were at the mercy of the 
vicissitudes of the physicians. This meant that punishment and treatment became fused 
under what Finkel refers to as "the presumption of expertise" (1988, p. 52). 
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2.2 LEGAL ASPECTS 
2.2.1 The insanity defence as a controversial construct 
Many authors emphasise that the insanity defence remains, from time immemorial, a 
highly controversial artifact in judiciaries around the world (Eigen, 1999; Finkel, 1988; 
Reznek, 1997; Skeem & Golding, 2001). Furthermore, the past two centuries have seen 
intense debate around this issue, particularly following high profile cases (Skeem & 
Golding, 2001). Prins (1980) eloquently refers to the grey area between mental disorder 
and criminal behaviour as "the borderland area" (p. 1). He goes on to argue that causal 
links between mental illness and criminality are difficult to make. Moreover, debate is 
not contained within judiciaries but is largely spurred by public outrage (Skeem & 
Golding, 2001). For South Africa, this was clearly demonstrated following the 
assassination of Verwoerd (Burchell & Milton, 1997; Louw & Allan, 1998). 
2.2.2 Insanity as a legal term 
In South Africa, issues of mental health in our criminal courts fall under criminal 
liability. Insanity is a legal, rather than a psychological or psychiatric, term (Louw, 
2006). Therefore, there is a clear distinction in the literature between the legal and 
medical usage of the term 'insane' with the term reserved exclusively for legal purposes 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005; Reznek, 1997). Reznek (1997) refers to this as exculpatory 
insanity which is a direct reference to the cognitive status of the accused's inability to 
infer right from wrong. This is a sharp departure from psychiatric assessments of patients 
who may be out of touch with reality due to more complex factors such as delusions or 
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hallucinations (Kaliski, 2006; Reznek, 1997). Thus, the impaired mental status of the 
accused will play a role in the evaluation of the accused, but the nomenclature remains in 
the judicial domain. Therefore, Reznek points out that it is possible to be simultaneously 
"insane in the medical sense but... judged legally sane" (1997, p. 17). 
The South African Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 allows for the legal defence of 
insanity as follows: 
Mental illness or defect may deprive a person of the capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of conduct. It may also deprive them of the capacity to control 
their conduct. A person who suffers from a mental condition that has such an 
effect is said to be 'insane'. (Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 370). 
Although the above definition appears straightforward, Kaliski (2006) warns that in 
South African law the terms 'mental illness', 'mental disorder' and 'mental defect' are 
not clearly defined. However, for judicial purposes the definition of these terms is 
broad referring to "a major psychiatric disorder that is known to be associated with 
significant cognitive and volitional impairments" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 98). The legal 
literature points out that it is not sufficient for there merely to be evidence of a mental 
illness, but requires that the incapacity interferes with the ability to discern right from 
wrong, and impedes the individual's ability to control his/her actions (Burchell & 
Milton, 1997). Therefore, "[mjental illness that impairs only affective capacity, or 
which does not deprive the sufferer of insight or self-control, does not come within the 
concept of insanity" (Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 374). Burchell and Milton (2005) 
state that in South African courts it has been precedented that no general sign or 
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symptom is prescribed as both necessary and sufficient to qualify as mental disease or 
defect, as this would be a dangerously narrow prescription (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
However, it is important to note that in this context mental illness or defect refers to: 
... a pathological disturbance of the accused's mental capacity and not a mere 
temporary mental confusion which is not attributable to a mental abnormality 
but rather to external stimuli such as alcohol, drugs or provocation (Burchell 
& Milton, 2005, p. 375). 
Thus, mental illness refers directly to an identifiable 'pathological' disease of the 
mind, which is usually endogenous in origin (Burchell & Milton, 2005; Louw, 2006). 
Burchell and Milton (2005) use physical illness as an analogy to infer that the mental 
illness or defect is involuntary, and therefore the person is not culpable. However, 
they state that this can frequently be difficult to establish, particularly as the law does 
not specifically distinguish between organic (brain) or functional (psychological) 
impairments. What is of importance is that the illness is not the result of 'external' 
stimuli such as the ingestion of substances (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
Louw (2006) makes the important comment that the definition of mental illness or 
defect described in the Mental Health Care Act (Act 17 of 2002) is not necessarily 
binding in a criminal court. This refers to the ultimate issue rule whereby "in court, it 
is a question of law and not of medicine as to what constitutes a 'mental illness or 
defect'" (p. 46). This is because medical diagnoses may not meet the statutory 
requirements of law which is to adduce the guilt of the accused (Louw, 2006). Thus, 
the court takes cognizance of expert psychiatric or psychological opinion, but is not 
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bound by this (Africa, 2005; Louw, 2006). Consequently, a criminal case is decided 
according to the unique characteristics pertaining to it and not according to a "closed 
list of mental illnesses or defects" (Louw, 2006, p. 47). 
The delineation between mental disease and defect rests with its developmental origins 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005). Mental defect is defined as a "condition where the person 
has a significantly below average intellectual functioning which is accompanied by 
significant limitations in several areas of adaptive functioning" (Africa, 2005, p. 392). 
Mental defect is most usually noticed early in life in terms of the failure to meet 
developmental milestones inhibiting the attainment of social and behavioural norms. It 
is inferred that "such individuals have such a low intellectual capacity that they do not 
have normal cognitive or conative functions" (Rumpff Commission cited in Louw, 
2006, p. 48). Forensic practice requires the assessment of the degree of mental 
retardation in ascertaining the accused's competence or lack of competency (Louw, 
2006). Dementias are normally categorised under mental defect, which refers largely 
to cognitive/intellectual deficits (Kaliski, 2006) 
Mental illness, on the other hand, can occur at any time and may be episodic in nature 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005). Therefore, criminal responsibility rests not on the illness 
or defect, but on how these deficits serve to constrain cognitive (insight) or conative 
(self-control) functioning at the time of the offence (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
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Thus, there are four elements to the insanity defence: an unlawful act; combined with 
evidence of mental illness or defect having a causal effect on the crime at the time of the 
offence; an illness/defect which predates the offence; and incapacity must be due to lack 
of cognitive or conative abilities (Louw, 2006). In South Africa, the consequence of a 
legal verdict of insanity is that the accused will be found "not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or mental defect" (Burchell & Milton, 1997, p. 396). The disposition of persons 
so determined will be dealt with in section 2.2.3 below. 
2.2.3 Criminal capacity 
In South African law one of the mitigating factors against criminal capacity 
(responsibility) is mental illness or defect. Furthermore, the accused is disposed 
differently to 'sane' criminals (Snyman, 2002 cited in Africa, 2005). Snyman (2002, 
cited in Kaliski, 2006) states that one can only plead lack of criminal capacity if one 
has indeed committed the offence. Because South African law assumes criminal 
capacity, it is the experts' task to raise evidence which might negate or impair this 
capacity (Kaliski, 2006). Moreover, criminal responsibility requires that the accused 
is able to merely 'appreciate the wrongfulness of the act' and "not that he should have 
an understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions of wrongfulness" (Kaliski, 2006, 
p. 103). In other words, although a person appreciates the wrongfulness of an act, 
delusions or hallucinations may impair his/her reality testing leading him/her to act 
contrary to that appreciation, and is thus not found responsible (Kaliski, 2006; Louw, 
2006). Consequently, the expert's role is to determine the extent to which the 
condition impairs the individual's ability to control his/her actions. 
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f̂c The test for capacity is a subjective one, deriving from objective evidence collected from 
the crime (Burchell & Milton, 2005). In South Africa the emphasis is on appreciation, as 
opposed to knowledge, of the wrongful act (Burchell & Milton, 2005). Appreciation 
refers to a wider test which, in addition to knowledge, allows for deliberation of the 
broader ramifications of acting unlawfully, and the ability to act in accordance with moral 
appreciation. The accused's behaviour is determined with reference to that individual's 
actions only and not compared to the 'reasonable person' (Louw, 2006), and is thus a 
subjective test. Of significance, South African law takes into account the impairment of 
capacity, and not merely the lack of capacity (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
South African law has statutory provisions for the following: "fitness to stand trial, the 
defence of mental illness, the defence of diminished responsibility, and the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity" (Africa, 2005, p. 385). This highlights that there are 
varying degrees of criminal responsibility (Africa, 2005). The two 'insanity' pleas, 
pathological and non-pathological incapacity, pertaining to this research are outlined 
below. 
2.2.4 Pathological versus non-pathological criminal incapacity 
Under South African criminal law the insanity defence is divided in two and is 
referred to as pathological incapacity and non-pathological incapacity (Louw, 2006). 
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Pathological incapacity requires mental illness which is endogenous in origin, as 
categorized in the DSM (Burchell & Milton, 2005). The mental disorders which have 
the requisite cognitive and conative impediment giving rise to the possibility of an 
insanity defence are: mental disorders due to a general medical condition, 
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mood disorders with psychotic features, 
and dissociative disorders (Burchell & Milton, 2005). Moreover, "it does not matter 
whether the illness is temporary or permanent, curable or incurable, or likely to recur 
or not" (Louw, 2006, p. 47) and causation of the illness is not at issue. Therefore, 
pathological incapacity refers to an inherent mental illness or defect which is 
identifiable by a formal psychiatric diagnosis and exists independently of the offence 
committed (Kaliski, 2006). This infers that the condition is treatable, and that because 
the symptoms may have driven the motivation for the offence, treatment could 
plausibly diminish the possibility of re-offending (Kaliski, 2006). 
Non-pathological incapacity is the instance where no illness or defect exists but 
"criminal incapacity that is due to circumstances that are supposedly external to the 
accused, such as intoxication, provocation and emotional stress" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 
105). The assumption behind this defence is that it is an isolated occurrence, is 
unlikely to occur again and therefore does not threaten public safety. However, Kaliski 
(2006) refers to this as a largely unfounded assumption. Here psychiatric diagnoses 
are seldom possible and inferences are made on the individual's stress state at the time 
of the offence which may have induced automatism-like behaviour. This defence is 
often used in murder cases, and largely hinges on the accused's behaviour following 
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the offence whereby he/she is bewildered or horrified by his/her actions and seeks help 
as opposed to attempting to evade responsibility (Kaliski, 2006). Moreover, there is 
frequently amnesia for the actual offence, but that the accused can give a clear account 
of preceding and subsequent events including the trigger which induced the 
'automatism' (Kaliski, 2006). Therefore, "[n]on-pathological incapacity is in essence 
a sane automatism defence" whereby the person's actions are not of his/her character 
and out of his/her control (Kaliski, 2006, p. 106). Furthermore, for this defence to 
succeed there must be no evidence of pre-meditation. Thus, non-pathological 
incapacity refers to an exceptional act which is outside the bounds of usual experience 
thereby disqualifying merely losing one's temper or acting in an enraged state. 
Additionally, it refers specifically to personality disintegration which affects insight 
and impulse control, and is thus, "a breakdown in functioning" (Africa, 2005, p. 401). 
S v Chretien (1981) was the first South African case where "a significant legal space 
was created to develop the defence of non-pathological incapacity" (Louw, 2006, p. 
50). This case introduced the notion of incapacity not being tied to a pathological 
mental illness, and the possibility that instances of poor insight or self-control could 
lead to an acquittal (Louw, 2006). Thereafter, defences of provocation or emotional 
stress became more frequent (Louw, 2006). However, it is argued that these two states 
are not synonymous, as provocation infers a once-off trigger event, whereas emotional 
stress is "a build-up of stressful circumstances over a period of time" (Louw, 2006, p. 
51). It was in 1985 that the defence of 'temporary non-pathological criminal 
incapacity' first emerged upon evidence of prolonged emotional stress (Louw, 2006). 
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However, following two controversial cases where the accused were acquitted even 
though they were found to be "consciously lacking self-control", the Supreme Court in 
2002 reverted to successful non-pathological defences requiring psychiatric features of 
sane automatism, and not merely the loss of control (Louw, 2006, p. 52). 
2.2.5 Automatisms 
Kaliski (2006) delineates the distinction between sane and insane automatisms. 
However, he asserts that "... few concepts have caused so much confusion in the 
courts" (p. 107). In South Africa, sane automatism refers to external factors which 
impair judgement. For instance, "hypoglycaemia due to overdose of insulin, head 
injury and intense provocation" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 107). Other examples are "while 
suffering a blackout... while asleep... under hypnosis... concussion... intoxication... 
provocation or extreme emotional stress" (Louw, 2006, p. 38). Whereas insane 
automatism is as a result of internal factors such as inherent illnesses of the brain, the 
most common seen in South African courts is complex partial epilepsy (Kaliski, 
2006). 
Complex partial epilepsy has the outward appearance of the person having purposive 
control over his/her actions (Kaliski, 2006). However, in reality the affected person 
during a seizure experiences an "electrical storm that overwhelms parts or all of the 
central nervous system" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 107). Accurate perceptions of the 
surrounding environment are said to range from being absent or impaired. Moreover, 
although actions superficially appear purposive, unlike grand mal type epilepsy, the 
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seizure severely impairs judgement, and amnesia of the event is common (Kaliski, 
2006). Therefore, the affected person "would not be able to plan and execute 
behaviours not previously rehearsed" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 107). The possibility of a 
fraudulent insanity defence under the guise of complex partial epilepsy is reduced by 
the aforementioned impaired volitional aspect, and by medical tests which are usually 
able to detect epilepsy (Kaliski, 2006). 
Disposition of the two pleas varies considerably, with insane automatisms resulting in 
committal as a state patient, and sane automatisms resulting in acquittal (Burchell & 
Milton, 2005; Louw, 2006). Our courts infer that because sane automatisms are not 
the result of a chronic illness, there is no disorder to treat and the likelihood of 
recidivism on this basis is extremely unlikely. Kaliski (2006) refers to the discrepancy 
in disposition as a 'curious distinction' because regardless of the cause of the 
automatism, it is inferred that brain dysfunction is at the root of both sane and insane 
automatisms. Moreover, it has been argued that South African courts have difficulty 
with the existing terminology and are beginning to prefer using the terms 'automatism 
not attributable to mental pathology' and 'psychogenic automatism' as opposed to 
insane and sane automatism respectively (Louw, 2006). 
2.2.6 Procedural aspects of establishing insanity 
Africa (2005) and Kaliski (2006) note that in South Africa any party in a criminal case 
can request a psychological assessment of the accused to establish current (fitness to 
stand trial) or retrospective (criminal capacity at the time of the offence) mental state, 
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under sections 77 and 78 respectively of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977). 
Furthermore, the burden of proof rests with the party who raises the question of 
competence or capacity (Kaliski, 2006). At present this is an untested amendment, 
however (Louw, 2006). 
With respect to violent crimes, Section 79 of the Criminal Procedures Act (51 of 1977, 
amended 1998) requires the appointment of two to three psychiatrists and possibly a 
clinical psychologist to assess the accused (Kaliski, 2006). In South Africa the 
appointment of psychiatrists is as follows: a psychiatrist in private practice is appointed 
for the defense; a psychiatrist in state service represents the superintendent of the 
hospital, and another hospital psychiatrist assesses the accused to provide an objective 
opinion (Kaliski, 2006). 
Of interest, it is not clear whether the various parties are required to confer. Psychiatrists 
working for the same hospital invariably produce a co-signed report however, and they 
are required to address "both requirements of the capacity test, namely insight and self-
control" (Louw, 2006, 50). 
In terms of the assessment of mental illness, the accused is remanded in a state 
psychiatric hospital with forensic facilities for up to a 30 day observation period from 
which the accused's mental state is determined (Africa, 2005; Kaliski, 2006). 
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The process of establishing criminal capacity is a stage-wise process. Firstly, the mental 
health practitioner establishes whether "the accused suffers from a mental illness, defect, 
or any other important condition" (Kaliski, 2006, p. 103). Secondly, if a disorder or 
condition is identified, the severity of the cognitive or volitional impairment needs to be 
established. And thirdly, the court must determine "whether these impairments 
influenced the accused's actions during the commission of the offence" (p. 103). The 
judicial disposition of defendants is addressed in the following section. 
2.2.7 Disposition of defendants 
Burchell and Milton (2005) draw attention to an anomaly in South African law where, 
should the accused successfully plead non-pathological incapacity, they may be 
acquitted. However, a plea of pathological incapacity results in institutional committal 
as a State President's Patient for an unspecified period. They refer to this state of 
affairs as a "gross inequality" which hinges on a due process discrepancy where the 
onus of proof shifts from the prosecution to the accused in instances of non-
pathological incapacity (Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 392). The shift in onus of proof 
is underpinned by two arguments; firstly that one should be wary of institutional 
committal if the accused's insanity is in doubt. And secondly, the accused's 'sanity' is 
best known, and therefore defended, by the accused. The argument against lessening 
the burden on the accused is that it may result in an increase in insanity pleas 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005). Nevertheless the irony of this position is that the 
prosecution may struggle to dispute the accused's insanity when it is raised. 
However, Wilson J states "it is better that a guilty person be found not guilty by reason 
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of insanity and committed for psychiatric treatment than an insane person be convicted 
of a crime" (cited in Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 394). Moreover, the principle behind 
indefinite committal is regarded as a sufficient deterrent against raising the insanity 
defence (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
Thus, the evidentiary burden dictates that only insane persons are committed to 
institutions for an unspecified period of time (Burchell & Milton, 2005). Proving 
issues of insanity can only occur with the cooperation of the accused. However, this 
does not cater for the accused under the pathological incapacity plea that was insane at 
the time of the crime, but has since recovered and is considered to be sane (Burchell & 
Milton, 2005). 
In the instance where the accused is found unfit to stand trial due to mental illness or 
defect, the court is required to decide on a balance of probabilities whether s/he 
committed the offence or not (Kaliski, 2006). Louw (2006) states that this is a less 
onerous task than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If the offence is not of a violent 
nature, or the court finds the accused is innocent, s/he may be civilly committed to a 
psychiatric institution or referred for out-patient treatment (Kaliski, 2006). However, in 
cases of violent crime combined with evidence of culpability, the accused is remanded in 
a forensic psychiatric hospital as a state patient under section 42 of the Mental Health 
Care Act of 2002 (Kaliski, 2006). If the accused is found to have developed a mental 
disorder subsequent to the committing of the offence and is thus unfit to stand trial, the 
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case will be remanded for treatment in a psychiatric institution until such time that he is 
found competent to stand trial (Kaliski, 2006). 
The reasoning behind indefinite committals is three fold: public protection, therapeutic 
treatment of the accused, and punishment (Burchell & Milton, 1997). However, Prins 
(1980) raises the ethical dilemma that an unspecified period of time may indeed be 
indefinite, as opposed to a prison term which is predetermined. Therefore, in essence, 
"because a man may be deemed to be mad, he may be doubly punished" (Prins, 1980, 
p. 37) and it is questioned whether this is a fair dispensation of justice (Kaliski, 2006). 
In sum, institutional committal results in the State being appointed as the legal 
guardian of State patients. 
2.2.8 Judicial management of State patients 
The Mental Health Care Act (2002) provides for the periodic review of the 
'incarceration' of State patients in psychiatric hospitals (Burchell & Milton, 2005). 
Sections 46, 47 and 48 refer to mechanisms relating to discharge or conditional discharge 
from institutions. They cite a number of different people who can apply for discharge of 
a State patient: 
The State patient himself or herself; an official curator ad litem; and 
administrator, if appointed; the head of the health establishment; the medical 
practitioner responsible for treatment; a spouse, an associate or next of kin of 
the state patient; or any other person authorized to act on his or her behalf (p. 
399). 
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In the instance of State patients who have committed a violent offence (for example, 
murder and culpable homicide) the official curator ad litem referred to above is the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who may challenge the application if they feel there is 
significant risk of public safety being threatened (Burchell & Milton, 2005). For other 
state patients applications are made via the hospital board who decides what type of 
discharge to grant, if any. Applications are then made to a Judge in chambers who makes 
the final decision whether the patient remains "a State patient; be reclassified and dealt 
with as a voluntary, assisted or involuntary mental health care user" or is discharged 
(Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 400). 
The role of psychology in the judicial process is explored in the following section. 
2.3 PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 
2.3.1 Competing paradigms within the psycholegal milieu 
There are many role players in the forensic system making it "truly a multidisciplinary 
area" (Gibbens, 1968, cited in Prins, 1980p. 1). Moreover, ".. .any claim to 
specialization [in this area] must lie in being able to cross...social and administrative 
boundaries, as well as in the specialized studies of particular mental conditions..." (p. 
1). 
The legal, and psychiatric paradigms have very different approaches to explaining 
human behaviour (Reznek, 1997), resulting in "an uneasy alliance" (Melton, Petrila, 
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Poythress & Slobogin, 1987, p. 3). On the one hand is the legal argument of the 
reasonable person with the capacity for free will. Here emphasis is often on linear and 
deterministic explanations for behaviour. On the other hand, complex, often 
deterministic, neurobiological explanations are offered from the psychiatric camp 
(Reznek, 1997). Thus, the crux of the distinction between the two is that psychiatrists 
look at causes of, and lawyers, reasons for, behaviour (Reznek, 1997). 
Indeed, this is further confounded by different approaches between psychiatrists and 
psychologists (Howitt, 2002). Psychiatrists are frequently accused by psychologists of 
promoting the medical model of illness which ignores psychosocial aspects of mental 
functioning and personality. Howitt (2002) asserts that psychiatrists are trained to 
give medical explanations for mental illness, whereas psychologists are concerned 
with the assessment and evaluation of how the illness impacts on the moral 
appreciation and competency of the accused. It is thus highly probable that there will 
be conflicting evidence if the two professions arrive at different conclusions (Howitt, 
2002), as these competing conclusions of mental capacity derive from entirely 
different theoretical ideologies (Reznek, 1997). 
As psychologists are now becoming more meaningful players in the judiciary they are 
required to have a deeper understanding of the complexities of their role as objective 
forensic specialists (Louw & Allan, 1998). This complex role is examined in section 
2.3.2 below. 
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2.3.2 Psychology in the forensic arena 
Finkel (1988) states that psychologists are frequently viewed equally with awe and 
suspicion by the court and the community. When the "forensic expert [psychologist] 
enters the courtroom to offer testimony, he or she often speaks in a language and thinks 
in dynamics that are foreign to lawyers, judges, and jurors" (p. 50). Thus, not 
infrequently, this leaves the bearers of the court questioning the scientific validity of 
psychology (Finkel, 1988). 
Moreover, not infrequently, the determination of insanity frequently becomes a 
battleground of experts in deciding whether the accused is either 'mad' or 'bad' (Reznek, 
1997). Although 'insanity' is a specifically legal term, psychiatrists and psychologists 
provide evidence and meaning to it. To a large extent these terms are informed by the 
taxonomy of the DSM which has shown to be malleable over time due to changes in 
value systems, expert opinion and advances in research (Howitt, 2002; Reznek, 1997). 
However, although psychology and psychiatry are scientific disciplines, diagnoses and 
testimony are more often than not deeply contested terrains (Allan & Louw, 2001; 
Reznek, 1997). Howitt (2002) notes that regularly, around the world, "[different 
diagnosticians may put the same patient in very different categories" (p. 289). As a 
result, it is not uncommon for the legal fraternity to question the professionalism of 
forensic psychiatrists and psychologists (Allan & Louw, 2001; Reznek, 1997). 
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2.3.3 Forensic psychology in South Africa 
Louw and Allan (1998) conducted research on psychologists practicing in the forensic 
arena in South Africa. They note that "forensic psychology as a field remains poorly 
defined in South Africa" in contrast to other western countries (p. 234). Indeed, there is 
to date no formal designation of 'forensic psychologist' by the governing body of 
psychologists (HPCSA). However, the use of psychologists in the criminal courts is on 
the increase, particularly in areas of non-pathological criminal responsibility and pre-
sentencing. Louw and Allan (1998) note though, that the volume of psycholegal work 
that South African psychologists have produced is still relatively low. Their concern is 
that this contributes to a vicious circle whereby the niche of forensic psychology is not 
being developed into a fully fledged discipline because psychologists are not willing or 
able to make a living exclusively through it. They assert that low case volumes may deny 
possibilities of psychologists gaining adequate forensic experience. This is further 
complicated by psychologists reporting that their training does not prepare them for 
forensic work, expert testimony and the writing of psycholegal reports. Consequently, 
Louw and Allan found that: 
... a noticeable number of local psychologists who do forensic work fail to 
appreciate that expert witnesses need to be astute professionals and specialists 
in the relevant field of psychology and au fait with the relevant legal rules and 
procedures as well as ethical rules (1998, p. 239). 
Unfortunately, this has resulted in much criticism of 'forensic' psychologists by the 
South African legal fraternity (Allan & Louw, 2001; Louw & Allan, 1998). Thus, it is 
advised that 'forensic' psychologists need to "change the paradigms they use, the 
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methods they use to gather information and make decisions, and how they express 
themselves in reports" (Louw & Allan, 1998, p. 239). The end result is that 'forensic' 
psychologists are seen to fall short in their role as expert witnesses. However, it is also 
argued that psychologists are a highly under-utilized resource which could contribute 
greatly to the psycholegal realm (Louw & Allan, 1998). 
Nevertheless, psychologists are now more frequently assessing the mental state of those 
accused where there is a question of incapacity due to mental illness or defect (Allan & 
Louw, 2001). 
2.3.4 The role of psychologists in assessing mental state in criminal courts 
Psychologists play an important role in assisting the court in establishing criminal 
capacity (Africa, 2005). Evaluations are required if there is a question about the 
accused's current mental state, and thus, fitness to stand trial. With pathological and non-
pathological pleas, criminal responsibility needs to be established for the time of the 
alleged offence, and how pathological and non-pathological factors contributed to 
impairment of functioning which specifically led to the commission of the act (Africa, 
2005). 
As stated in the section dealing with procedural aspects of establishing 'insanity' above, 
the Criminal Procedures Act (s79, 51 of 1977), was amended in 1998 to specifically 
allow for the appointment of a clinical psychologist, at the courts discretion (Kaliski, 
2006). The Act specifies the referral of the accused for psychiatric or psychological 
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assessment should there be a question regarding his/her mental state. This is a significant 
move in South African legal history as previously, although psychologists were 
conducting assessments, this service was not provided for in the Act (Louw & Allan, 
1998). Thus, clinical psychologists are now formally recognised as meaningful 
contributors to assisting the courts with criminal incapacity due to mental illness or 
defect. 
It should be noted that it is not the psychologist or mental health worker who makes a 
decision about the accused's mental state (Africa, 2005), this is for the court to decide 
from the basis of the expert testimony, referring to the ultimate issue rule (Allan & Louw, 
2001). Therefore, "the issue of determining criminal responsibility is a legal question 
while the evaluation of mental state is a psychological question" (Africa, 2005, p. 398). 
2.3.5 Perceptions of psychologists as expert witnesses 
Allan and Louw (2001) conducted research in South Africa on lawyers' opinions of 
psychologists who act as expert witnesses. They note with concern that their findings 
show that lawyers significantly "did not believe that the potential value, or actual 
contribution, of psychological testimony was high" (p. 12). This was linked to 
skepticism regarding psychologists as biased, psychologists as making too many 
concessions under cross-examination, and psychologists largely failing in lawyers' 
expectations of their knowledge as experts in the field of psychology (Allan & Louw, 
2001). 
29 
However, despite criticism of psychologists as expert witnesses, South African judges 
have in the past expressed the need for psychological testimony in assisting the court 
(Allan & Louw, 2001). Moreover, Allan and Louw (2001) state that psychologists are an 
under- utilized resource in South Africa in comparison to the United Kingdom, United 
States, Australia and New Zealand. 
2.4 THE INSANITY DEFENCE AS AN ARTIFACT OF VIOLENT CRIME 
As has been mentioned above, in order for an insanity defence raised, a concomitant 
crime is required (Kaliski, 2006). 
There have been controversial and contradictory findings in the interface between mental 
disorders and violent crime in relation to risk assessment and predictions of 
dangerousness (Cohen, 2005). Early research suggested that although there were no 
significant differences for non-violent crimes, psychiatric patients were found to commit 
more violent crimes than their 'normal' cohorts (Cohen, 2005). This was contested by 
later research results which, when controlling for other social variables, found no 
distinction between mentally ill offenders and normal cohorts. However, recent evidence 
has more conclusively linked specific mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia with 
violence (Cohen, 2005). The extensive history of research in this field has largely been 
prompted by the trend of de-institutionalising psychiatric patients. However, although 
research continues, an incidental finding to the research underpinning this debate is that 
mental health professionals find the reliable predicting of violence in psychiatric patients 
very difficult (Cohen, 2005). 
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Following the assassination of Verwoerd, efforts were made by the South African state to 
monitor possible violent psychiatric out-patients (Cohen, 2005). This led to the 
introduction, and later repealing of psychopathy as a mental illness (Cohen, 2005). More 
recently, legislation has introduced indefinite sentences for offenders who were 
considered violent (but not necessarily mentally ill). However, lately some debates in 
the appeal court have begun to test indefinite sentences (Cohen, 2005). 
Cohen (2005) notes that "[t]he notion of 'risk of harm to others' is threaded through 
South Africa's Mental Health Care Act (2002)". Mental health care professionals are thus 
by inference required to make an estimation of risk to the community at large (p. 268). It 
is important to remember that the Act functions for the safety of the patient as well as the 
community (Cohen, 2005). 
Contextually, for South Africans, violent crime is cause for significant public unease. 
Indeed, Dissel (2002, cited in Cohen, 2005) notes that South Africa has one of the highest 
rates of violent crime in the world, and furthermore, that recidivism is between 85 and 
94%. Moreover, Cohen (2005) asserts that because the rate of rape and murder is so high, 
risk assessments of dangerousness are concomitantly high on the political agenda, putting 
pressure on mental health professionals to be more conservative in their appraisals. 
2.4.1 'Mad' versus bad 
Judiciaries have for centuries had to grapple with the distinction between mad and bad 
in deliberating an insanity defence (Reznek, 1997; Skeem & Golding, 2001). This 
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conundrum is increasingly being played out regarding extreme sociopathy whereby 
defendants are charged with heinous crimes incomprehensible to laypeople (Reznek, 
1997). Skeem and Golding (2001), note that the controversy has both historically and 
currently been centred on whether defendants should be absolved of criminal 
responsibility because they are 'morally insane'. However, Rezneck (1997) argues 
that as a moral society it is important to maintain the insanity defence in protecting 
those that are genuinely mentally ill or cognitively incapacitated at the relevant time. 
Therefore, in his view, it is important to legally distinguish between those that are 
'evil' and those that are 'ill'. 
In the 19th century psychopathy was described as "a selectively diseased state of will in 
an otherwise intact individual", an "irresistible impulse' to commit an offence... 
manifested by a single, unpredictable, heinous act committed with no apparent motive" 
(Ray 1861 cited by Belkin, 1996; Fullwinder, 1975, in Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 593). 
Although there was much debate then about whether to allow moral insanity as a legal 
defence, it was finally rejected following a high profile case in 1881 (Skeem & Golding, 
2001). In the 20th century the terminology shifted from moral insanity to moral depravity 
to psychopathy or antisocial personality disorder (Skeem & Golding, 2001), as reflected 
in current psychiatric nosology, the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). 
However, in South Africa, psychopathy was previously regarded under the Mental Health 
Care Act as a certifiable mental illness (Louw, 2006). The Criminal Procedures Act was 
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amended in 1993 thereby removing psychopathy as a mental illness (Louw, 2006). With 
regard to 'psychopaths' or dangerous offenders, the South African legal system has 
shifted from accommodating such offenders in rehabilitative psychiatric hospitals to 
labeling them as dangerous criminals and incarcerating them in prison for indefinite 
periods of time under Sections 286A and B of the Criminal Procedures Act (Burchell & 
Milton, 2005). Thus, personality disorders do not currently satisfy the requirements for 
the legal definition of insanity. 
The reasoning behind this is that personality disorders are "not a consequence of 
disturbance of the psychic state but rather patterns of behaviour learned during the 
formative years" (Burchell & Milton, 2005, p. 386). The legal precedent laid down by 
Justice W H Booysen states that viewing psychopathy as an illness "is not only 
scientifically untenable, but is also not effective in practice (cited in Burchell & Milton, 
2005, p. 387). This hinges on the issue of criminal capacity whereby psychopaths are 
regarded as doli capax because "he knows what is and what is not lawful and he has the 
mental capacity to act accordingly" (Rumpff CJ 1976 cited in Burchell & Milton, 2005, 
p. 388). However, Burchell and Milton (2005) cite cases where personality disorder 
impairments may underpin extenuating circumstances or may be argued in mitigation of 
sentence. 
Interestingly, Skeem and Golding (2001) found that one third of their sample believed 
that psychopathy contained elements of insanity. This demonstrates that common lore 
continues to confuse psychosis with psychopathy, thereby conceptualising the insane 
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offender as "a malevolent, detached, irrational, and unpredictably violent offender" 
(Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 592). This perception endures even though the conflation is 
both contradictory and illogical (Skeem & Golding, 2001). Carson, Butcher and Mineka 
(1998, cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001, p.594) state that these perceptions have deep 
historical roots from when madness was associated with "demonic possession or with the 
punishment for sin". This is underscored by Skeem and Golding's (2001) sample who 
appropriately complained that they found it very difficult to draw a distinction between 
psychopathy and insanity. 
2.4.2 Szasz's argument against the insanity defence 
Szasz (1990; 1994) argues for the abolition of the insanity defence as he believes there 
is no such thing as mental illness, thereby nullifying the mad/bad distinction (Rezneck, 
1997). 
Szasz (1990; 1994), one of the major proponents of 'anti-psychiatry', argues that all 
human beings are moral agents and thus should be held accountable for their actions. 
Concomitant to his argument is that the 'mentally ill' cannot be deprived of their 
liberty if they are innocent, and should be punished if guilty. Thus, he contends that 
"(mis)behaviours are not diseases" but are named thus for the purposes of coercion by 
psychiatrists and the State to both medicate and institutionalise (1994, p. 34). For anti-
psychiatrists, coercion refers to labeling deviancy as a justifiable means and form of 
social control by the state (Cohen, 2005). Moreover, in the state controlling 
'deviancy' by identifying with the medical model and thereby medicating and 
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institutionalizing people because of mental illness, pathogenic aspects of our society 
are obfuscated (Cohen, 2005). 
Szasz states that it is misleading to assume that insanity stems from a biologically 
medical cause (cited in Rezneck, 1997; Szasz, 1994). He argues that 'insanity' is not 
an illness but has become a convenient excuse for badness because it is described 
within the medical discourse. This is particularly the case when inexplicably violent 
crimes are committed which society attributes to madness, thus confusing badness 
with insanity (Rezneck, 1997). 
2.5 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSANITY DEFENCE2 
2.5.1 Research on jurors' attitudes to the insanity defence 
Skeem (Skeem & Golding, 2001) has done extensive research over a number of years in 
the United States on jurors, mock jurors and university students, and their perceptions of 
the insanity defence. Her research consisted of a series of studies comprising qualitative 
and quantitative methodology. 
Skeem and Golding's (2001) research is particularly important as it assesses belief 
systems about insanity, and explores the interface between law and psychology. They 
make the significant point that jurors are not the blank slates the law purports them to be, 
~ Skeem and Goldings (2001) research on opinions of the insanity defence was cited here because Skeem 
was the author of the Likert scale used in this research. Although other bodies of research are referred to 
by Skeem and Golding, and listed in online databases, the cost of purchasing them were prohibitively 
expensive. 
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as they have life experiences and stereotypical opinions that frame their understandings 
of both what the courts requires of them and of what it means to be incapacitated through 
mental illness. Therefore, their "preconceptions and attitudes affect their legal decision 
making" skills (p. 561). 
Of concern, although jurors are instructed to be impartial, it has been found that their 
attitudes are biased against the insanity defence and this may be detrimental in their 
deliberations of verdicts. Negative biases were described as "grossly inaccurate as well 
as inflexible" (Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 563). The inaccuracies cited here refer to 
opinions that the insanity defence is a loophole in the law which is not only frequently 
raised, but allows 'sane' criminals to be absolved of responsibility and given 
opportunities to re-offend and thus threaten public safety (Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
They cite research which consistently demonstrates that negative biases are not only 
prevalent, but enduring even when respondents are shown conclusive statistical evidence 
to the contrary. Moreover, research is demonstrating that jurors, not uncommonly, don't 
fully understand instructions given to them on legal definitions of insanity and "interpret 
instructions differently in light of their own experiences" thus demonstrating intuitive as 
opposed to accurate understandings of insanity (Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 564). 
Much research shows that the lay public has very poor conceptualisations of mental 
illness (cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001). Roberts and Golding (1991, cited in Skeem & 
Golding, 2001) found that there was a strong correlation between jurors' attitudes 
towards the insanity defence, the way in which they interpreted the case, and the final 
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verdict. However, Finkel and Handel (1989, cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001) found that 
"no single construct is determinative across cases or describes the essence of insanity" (p. 
567). All research results considered, Skeem and Golding (2001) state that the lay 
public's negative opinions of the insanity defence raises the possibility of defendants not 
receiving a fair trial under a jury system. 
Although the lay publics' understanding of insanity does not correspond well with legal 
definitions, there is very little overlap between their opinions and those of psycho-legal 
experts (Skeem & Golding, 2i#l). In fact, "[m]ost laypeople are unfamiliar with expert 
definitions of these constructs and define them differently than experts do" (Skeem & 
Golding, 2M1, p. 575). 
Indeed, the wild beast test of 1724 has held sway for centuries largely because it is an 
embedded ideological construct within western societies (Skeem & Golding, 2001). Of 
interest, research is demonstrating that this perception still holds currency to this day 
(Perlin, 1994 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2i l l ) . They ascribe this to formidable media 
representations of the "mentally ill as fundamentally inhuman and sometimes as "slow, 
backward and inarticulate'" (Wahl, 1995 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 592). It 
was only in the 19th century that saw reform for the insane in the form of liberalizing the 
way in which the 'insane' were treated, effectively raising their status from that of a beast 
to a human being (Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
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Skeem and Golding (2001) employed prototype theory to explain jurors' intuitive 
understandings of the insanity defence. Prototype theory refers to the ways in which 
individuals broadly categorise experiences or opinions stereotypically to form prototypes 
which are then generalised to explain constructs which have similar attributes (Skeem & 
Golding, 2001). In essence, prototypes are "preconceptions and attitudes" which are 
informed by past experience and become belief systems, which are then extrapolated to 
interpret new experiences. Thus, prototypes drive worldviews which by their nature are 
stereotypical as individuals use their past experiences/beliefs as a template for their 
opinions. Consequently, opinions are frequently incorrect, particularly where emotive 
issues, such as the insanity defence, are raised. Therefore, it is important to note that 
prototypes will vary according to learning experiences, and across cultures and thus, can 
be highly heterogenous and multifaceted (Skeem & Golding, 2001). They cite numerous 
research studies which support their hypotheses that "[jjurors have prototypes of the 
criminally insane that organise the piecemeal information that they informally encounter 
about insanity and that these prototypes guide their legal decision making" (p. 569). 
Moreover, the lay public has a prototype for the 'criminal madman' (Cantor et al.., 1982, 
cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001). This prototype is exemplified mostly by psychiatric 
symptoms, mental state at the time of the offence, personality characteristics, and 
interaction with the mental health system (Skeem & Golding, 2001). This indicates that 
prototypes can concur with the criminal justice system's requirements, though Skeem and 
Golding's findings were that "jurors do not substantially agree on even a subset of the 
features that characterize insanity" (2001, p. 582). However, they found three broad 
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prototypes: severe mental disability (chronic functional or intellectual impairment), moral 
insanity (psychopathy) and mental state-centred characteristics (impairment in mental 
status). An overlapping and underlying feature of the three prototypes was psychosis, 
particularly cognitive and volitional impairments due to psychotic disorder. Skeem and 
Golding (2001) note that although these prototypes concur with legal requirements for the 
insanity defence, they converge with more simplistic and extreme notions such as the 
wild beast test of 1724 (consistent with prior research conducted by Hans & Slater, 
Perlin, 1997; 1984; Roberts et al., 1987 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001). This implies 
that "jurors are more inclined to deem defendants with physical impairments such as 
mental retardation insane, than those with 'strictly psychiatric' impairments" (Skeem & 
Golding, 2001, p. 591). 
An important feature of the distinctive prototypes distilled from Skeem and Goldings' 
(2001) research is that jurors expect impairments to be supported by expert evidence and 
be independent of substance use. Thus, expert evidence and testimony are critical salient 
features for jurors' deliberations on the insanity defence (Finkel & Groscup, 1997; 
Ogloff, 1991 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
A significant finding by Skeem and Golding (2001) is that a third of their sample 
believed it wrong to punish defendants who are mentally ill. Less than one quarter of the 
sample believed that the insanity defence was justified and "that the constitutional rights 
ascribed to defendants were necessary components of the legal process" (p. 605). Of 
interest, in parallel research findings (Skeem, 1999 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001), 
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those that upheld the insanity defence were much less authoritarian in their attitudes than 
those who didn't. However, they found a discrepancy between male and female views, 
with educated men more supportive of the insanity defence than women. They cite 
research which "found that gender-related differences in prototypes were attributable to 
differences in life experiences" (Kempton, 1981 cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 
601). More specifically, that women may feel more vulnerable than men because of 
media depictions of themselves as targeted by 'madmen' (Wahl, 1995 cited). And further 
research which demonstrated that "women perceive the mentally ill as more dangerous 
than men" (Ryan, 1998 cited, p. 601). 
Consequently, of grave concern, their aggregate findings suggest that jurors' views did 
not correspond well with the law, did not believe in the merits of the insanity defence and 
as a result were much more inclined to convict (Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
2.6 SUMMARY 
The insanity defence under South African law is referred to more appropriately as 
pathological and non-pathological incapacity, and allows for defendants to be found not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The disposition of defendants varies depending on the plea, 
with pathological incapacity resulting in indefinite committal as State patients in 
psychiatric institutions, and non-pathological incapacity with acquittal. 
Having reviewed the literature on the judicial process, the role of psychologists in 
establishing criminal incapacity and previous research on lay public's opinions of the 
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insanity defence, the methodology and results of this research study will be presented in 




3.1 AIMS AND RATIONALE 
The impetus behind this research is based on American research which surveyed lay 
assumptions about the insanity defence (Skeem & Golding, 2001). This prompted 
eliciting opinions of South African clinical psychologists toward the insanity defence, 
and became the aim of this research study. Specifically, it was considered important to 
canvas clinical psychologists' opinions of the insanity defence since the Criminal 
Procedures Act (s79, Act 51 of 1977, amended in 1998) has enabled clinical 
psychologists to increasingly become meaningful contributors to the South African 
forensic setting (Kaliski, 2006). Moreover, the escalating rate of violent crime in South 
Africa (Dissel, 2002 cited in Cohen, 2005) raises the importance of deliberating the 
merits of such a defence. 
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research questions were employed, as opposed to hypotheses, as no previous research 
literature was found on psychologists' opinions of the insanity defence. Thus, this is 
essentially an explorative study (Punch, 2004). 
Question 1: Will the Insanity Defense Attitude-Revised (IDA-R) scale scores 
demonstrate broad differences of opinion about the insanity 
defence amongst the clinical psychologists sampled? 
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Question 2: Will there be an association between IDA-R scale scores and the 
sample's gender, race or age? 
Question 3: Will there be an association between IDA-R scale scores and 
clinical psychologists' therapeutic orientation or primary work 
setting? 
Question 4: Will there be a significant association between IDA-R scores and 
clinical psychologists who have more practice experience, forensic 
experience and who have processed more criminal cases? 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This is an exploratory nomothetic, cross sectional quantitative study, as no other South 
African research has been done with clinical psychologists on this topic. Thus, this 
research aims to collect some descriptive data on the main research question, and to 
explore some inter-relationships between variables using a correlational design. The 
correlational design has been selected because it ".. .measures two or more characteristics 
of the same individuals [and] computes the correlation of these characteristics" 
(Woodworth cited in Goodwin, 2002, p. 148). All the variables are treated alike as they 
are essentially subject variables, with there being no true independent variable 
(Woodworth cited in Goodwin, 2002). In accordance with the theory behind correlational 
research, no inferences will be made about the causal relationships between the variables 
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(Goodwin, 2002; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). However, the strength of the association 
between two variables will be examined using Pearson r as the correlation coefficient of 
choice (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). 
3.4 INSTRUMENTS 
3.4.1 Demographic data sheet 
An anonymous questionnaire requesting information on each respondent's personal and 
biographical details, experience and qualifications (Appendix A) was attached to the 
attitude scale detailed below. 
3.4.2 Insanity Defense Attitude-Revised scale (IDA-R) 
Skeem and Evans-DeCicco (2004) developed this scale (Appendix B) to assess potential 
jurors' attitudes towards defendants who used the insanity defence in the United States. 
More specifically, its aim was to provide a useful tool to attorneys during the jury 
selection process. This scale arose out of Skeem's extensive research into opinions about 
the insanity defence (Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
Although it is purported to be "a psychometrically sound assessment" (Skeem & Evans-
DeCicco, 2004, p. 187) no data on reliability and validity of the scale could be found in 
the original publication, and several attempts to obtain this information were 
unsuccessful. However, Skeem, the principal author of the scale, attests that the "IDA-R 
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has adequate convergent and discriminant validity and predicts insanity case judgements 
relatively strongly" (cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 584). 
The scale assesses two factors: 
1. Strict Liability-Reduced Capacity. This refers to the opinion that "mental illness 
is relevant to the issue of criminal responsibility" and therefore a mitigating factor in 
deliberating the accused's criminal capacity (Skeem & Golding, 2001, p. 584). 
2. Perceived Injustice and Danger. This refers to the extent to which opinions about 
the insanity defence are negatively biased, whereby the lay public believes it is used to 
evade responsibility and return dangerous offenders to the streets, only to re-offend 
(Skeem & Golding, 2001). 
The scale is provided with its own scoring system (Appendix D) which has a range of 
scores from 17 to 119. The lower the score the more a respondent is in favour of the 
insanity defence, with high scores denoting not only lack of support of this defence, but 
also lack of faith in the criminal justice system (Skeem & Evans-DeCicco, 2004). If one 
takes the midway point between the IDA-R scale score's lower (17) and upper (119) 
limits, the average score obtainable is 68. In order to establish cut-off points for 
interpretation of the scores, this study assumes that on a continuum, scores above 69 
denote low support for the insanity defence, graduating toward extremely negative 
opinions. Scores between 17 and 37 denote strong support for the defence, scores 
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between 38 and 47 demonstrate moderate support, and scores between 48 and the 
midpoint of 68 suggest some ambivalence about the defence. 
3.5 PROCEDURE 
This sample was selected from the HPCSA's 2002 list of registered clinical psychologists 
to which the researcher had access. The total number of clinical psychologists (N = 
1837) was alphabetized and allocated a number from 1 to 1837 on an Excel spreadsheet. 
The targeted number of recipients for this study was 500 which was approximately one 
quarter of the practicing clinical psychologists in South Africa. In order to obtain a 
systematic sample (Katzenellenbogen, Joubert & Abdool Karim, 1999) the total of 1837 
was divided by 500 which indicated that approximately every fourth psychologist should 
be selected. Of these, 20 were living outside of South Africa and were thus excised. 
Any clinical psychologists who had been canvassed by another Masters student in 2006 
were removed so as to not tax the same psychologist twice and thus attempt to improve 
the response rate. This process of ratio selection was done five times with each round 
being colour coded to ensure a systematically representative sample, until 500 clinical 
psychologists were selected within South Africa. 
This is considered a purposive sample as clinical psychologists were specifically selected 
for two reasons. Firstly, in their training they would have experience assessing and 
understanding mental illness and retardation; and secondly, it is clinical psychologists, as 
opposed to other registered categories, who are generally requested to assist the court on 
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matters of 'insanity'. Thus, it is seemed important to canvas their opinions of the insanity 
defence as they are becoming increasingly meaningful players in our judicial system. 
On the 15 May 2006 the questionnaires together with the demographic data sheet and a 
brief letter from the author (Appendix C) was posted to the 500 clinical psychologists 
with self-addressed reply paid envelopes for them to return the completed questionnaires. 
The envelopes and letters had the UKZN Pietermaritzburg Psychology Department's 
letterhead to give the research added credibility (Yammarino, Skinner & Childer, 1991). 
The author's cellular and after hours telephone numbers, and email address were included 
should any of the respondents have any queries. Due to time and resource constraints no 
follow up was made to facilitate the response rate. 
3.6 QUALITY OF RESPONSE 
Although the initial deadline for the return of questionnaires stated in the covering letter 
was set for 15 July 2006, this was extended to 31 August 2006, by which time 12.8% (n = 
64) replied with useable and completed data sheets and questionnaires. Four respondents 
(0.08%) marked their questionnaires 'incomplete' to indicate that they were unable to 
participate in the survey. An unanticipated source of data for this research was, of the 64 
useable questionnaires, 14 (22%) of the respondents had annotated comments to the 
questionnaires expressing opinions of the insanity defence. Of the 500 questionnaires 
mailed, 8% (n = 41) were returned to sender due to the addresses being incorrect. 
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The data derived from the demographic data sheet and IDA-R scale scores was entered 
into the SPSS 13 (2006) programme for statistical analysis. 
3.7 SAMPLE 
The sample for this research study consisted of 64 clinical psychologists who responded 
to the mailed questionnaire. This sample has representation from the four South African 
race groups, namely, Black, Indian, White and Coloured. Their university and date of 
completion of training, as well as their highest qualification was canvassed. This was 
combined with information gleaned on their primary work settings and therapeutic 
orientations; their years in psychological practice and forensic experience; and the 
number of criminal cases they may have processed. 
3.8 ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Since no clinical psychologists have previously been researched regarding their opinions 
of the insanity defence, this research is largely exploratory, employing descriptive 
statistics to extrapolate the characteristics of this sample in terms of their demographic 
data and representation of the IDA-R Scale scores (Coolican, 1999). Some inferential 
statistics were deployed to further this aim. 
Although Skeem and Golding's (2001) research informed this study, their methodology 
and means of data analysis were not replicated for two reasons. Firstly, the IDA-R scale 
formed a very small portion of Skeem's overall research which spanned 3 interconnected 
studies consisting of qualitative and quantitative components. Secondly, very little detail 
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was given regarding their methods of analysis for the IDA-R segment of their research. 
What could be ascertained is that a correlational matrix and factor analysis was 
employed, together with a MANOVA in comparing the IDA-R scores with two other 
scales used. Although two factors were published, no detail was given about how the 32 
point scale was reduced to the 2 stated factors. Reliability coefficients were not declared 
in the original publication. It was felt that without documentation of how factors were 
allocated in Skeem's (2001) research, no comparison could be made with this study. For 
reasons explored below, it was felt that non-parametric tests were more appropriate than 
parametric tests. 
Due to some aspects of this sample's variance, containing extreme scores, it was decided 
to employ non-parametric tests because they are considered distribution-free tests 
(Howell, 2002). Moreover, due to the small sample size, non-parametric tests were 
considered more suitable than parametric tests (Goodwin, 2002). Additionally, non-
parametric tests are sensitive to median values and are relatively unaffected by extreme 
scores because of their ranking procedures (Howell, 2002). Therefore, it is argued that 
the liberal assumptions of the non-parametric tests allow for this exploratory research 
process (Howell, 2002). 
All statistical procedures detailed below employed the use of each participant's aggregate 
IDA-R scale scores as a quantifiable measurement of their attitude toward the insanity 
defence. All percentages referred to in the text, unless stated to the contrary, used the 
sample size of 64 as the denominator. 
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A reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha) was calculated to determine the reliability of 
the IDA-R scale to determine the internal consistency of the questionnaire (Durrheim, 
1999c). 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to extrapolate possible differences in opinion 
measured by the IDA-R scale scores in terms gender. This non-parametric test is known 
as the analogue to the t test for independent groups, and is considered appropriate in 
measuring a small sample with heterogenous variances (Coolican, 1999; Herman, 2001). 
The observed z is reported because one or more of the groups is larger than 20 (Morgan, 
Reichert & Harrison, 2002). 
Correlation coefficients were calculated amongst all the variables to identify possible 
inter-relationships which had not been anticipated by the research questions. Pearson's r 
was selected as the coefficient of choice in extrapolating the degree of relatedness 
between variables (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). Categorical variables were dummy 
coded to facilitate measurement with continuous variables (Rosnow & Rosenthall, 1999). 
Correlation coefficients were thus able to be used to detect possible statistically 
significant relationships between IDA-R scores and the participants' therapeutic and 
practice orientations, and their experience as measured by practice years, forensic years 
and criminal cases processed. 
Finally, race by IDA-R scale scores were tabulated using the Chi-Square test for nominal 
data (Coolican, 1999). Race was difficult to compute because of high variances, 
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combined with some race groups having only two representatives in the sample (Heiman, 
2001). Although the assumptions of the Chi-Square test were violated due to there being 
less than the five expected respondents for some race categories, it is believed that the 
flexible assumptions of non-parametric tests allow for these results to be presented in this 
research (Howell, 2002). 
The descriptive and inferential results extrapolated from the data analysis will be 




4.1 DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE 
This section explores the demographic data (race, age, gender) of the clinical 
psychologists sampled (N= 64). A disclaimer was included next to the request to specify 
the race group of respondents stating that "[u]nder apartheid reference to race was 
generally seen as offensive. For this study race is a variable of academic interest only" 
(see Appendix A). Further information was requested on the data sheet such as the 
respondents' highest qualification, university of training, professional experience, 
therapeutic orientation and primary work setting. Although some (n = 4) of the 
questionnaires were missing some demographic data they were included in the statistical 
analysis. 
Table 1 
Cross-tabulation of race by gender. 
White Black Coloured Indian Total  
Gender Male 22 3 0 2 27 
Female 25 4 2 0 31 
Total 47 7 2 2 58  
JV=58 
Table 1 show that male and female psychologists were almost equally represented, with 
female respondents representing 48.4%, and male respondents representing 42.1% of the 
sample respectively. In terms of the race variable, White respondents comprised 73.4% 
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(n = 47), with Black respondents reflecting 10.9% (n = 7), and Indian and Coloured both 
at 3.1% (n = 2). Although this is not an accurate reflection of the racial representation of 
South Africa's population (Statistics South Africa, 2006), it is considered a rough 
approximation of the racial profile of psychologists currently registered with the HPCSA 
(Duncan, Van Niekerk & Townsend, 2004). 
Table 1 further breaks down the data by the race of respondents. The results show that 
White women (39%) dominated the sample, with their male (34%) counterparts a close 
second. Four percent of the respondents were Black men, with Black women representing 
6% of the sample. Coloured and Indian respondents were represented solely by women 
(3%) and men (3%) respectively. It should be noted that these numbers were confounded 
by missing data for both variables. 
Table 2 
Means and standard deviations of race by age. 
Race Group Mean Age n Standard Deviations 
White 48.4 49 12.43 
Black 45.6 7 7.89 
Indian 52.5 2 0.707 
Missing 6 
Total 48,2 64 11.75  
7V=64 
The samples' age representation (Table 2) had a mean of 48.2 years with the median and 
mode coinciding at 46 years (SD = 11.09). A broad range of ages was evidenced (range 
= 51 years). When considering this variable by race, however, overall, age tended to 
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cluster around the late forties. Coloured respondents could not be tabulated as neither of 
the participants included their age. 
Figure 1 
Age in years by experience: Forensic and practice years, and criminal cases processed. 














Age in Years 
Figure 1 depicts age by experience in terms of years in practice, forensic years and 
criminal cases processed. This figure dramatically demonstrates that the bulk of this 
samples' experience, particularly forensic experience, lies with psychologists who are 
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aged 56 and older. Not unexpectedly, relatively strong correlations found that older 
psychologists dominated the field in terms of experience as measured by practice years 
(r = 0.727, p<0.05) and forensic years (r = 0.541, p<0.05), and criminal cases processed 
(r=0.294,/?<0.05). 
Table 3 
Frequencies of practice and forensic experience for clinical psychologists. 
Practice i Experience Forensic Experience 
Years n % n % 
0 0 0 29 45.3 
1-5 8 12.5 10 15.6 
6 - 1 0 18 28.1 6 9.38 
11-15 7 10.9 6 9.38 
16-20 12 18.8 7 10.9 
21-25 8 12.5 1 1.56 
26 plus 9 14.1 2 3.13 
Total 62 96.9 61 95.3 
Missing 2 3.13 3 4.63 
Total 64 100 64 100 
N=64 
In terms of professional experience the sample demonstrated broad ranges (Table 3). The 
sample's years in practice had a mean of 15.17 years. However, the range was 44 years 
with bimodal years between 6 and 8 years (SD = 9.28 years). For forensic experience, 
the sample had a mean of 6.42 years. However, the modal value was 0 years with a range 
of 36 years (SD = 8.88 years). Table 3 shows that almost half of the sample had no 
forensic experience (45.3%, n = 29) 
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Table 4 
Frequencies of psychologists who have processed criminal cases. 
No. of Criminal Cases Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative 
0 
Percent Percent 
Valid 25 39.1 40.3 40.3 
1 8 12.5 12.9 53.2 
2 4 6.25 6.45 59.7 
4 1 1.56 1.61 61.3 
5 3 4.69 1.61 66.1 
6 1.56 1.61 67.7 
8 1.56 1.61 69.4 
10 1.56 1.61 71 
17 1.56 1.61 72.6 
17.5 1.56 1.61 74.2 
20 4 6.25 6.45 80.6 
25 1.56 1.61 82.3 
28 1.56 1.61 83.9 
30 5 7.81 8.06 91.9 
100 1.56 1.61 93.5 
120 1.56 1.61 95.2 
150 1.56 1.61 96.8 
600 1.56 1.61 98.4 
1000 1.56 1.61 100 
Missing Total 62 96.9 100 
System 2 3.13 
Total 64 100 
N=64 
The number of criminal cases processed (Table 4) produced the largest variance amongst 
the sample, with a broad standard deviation of 147.46 cases and a range of 1000 cases. 
Here the measures of central tendency differed substantially, with the mean, mode and 
median at 37.84, 0, and 1 cases respectively. Thirty-nine percent (n = 25) of the sample 
had not professionally been exposed to criminal/forensic cases, with a very small 
proportion (7%, n = 5) having processed more than 100 cases. Of interest, in terms of 
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gender, although more women (n = 16) than men (n = 9) had not processed any criminal 
cases, the respondent with the most reported criminal case experience was a woman (n -
1000). 
Those practitioners who had more years of practice experience had statistically 
significantly more years of forensic experience (r = 0.667, /?<0.01), and number of 
criminal cases processed (r = 0.349, p<0.01). Moreover, not unexpectedly, those with 
forensic experience had processed the most criminal cases (r = 0.414, p<0.01). 
Figure 2 
Gender by years in practice. 
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Analysis of gender by years in practice (Figure 2) demonstrates a pattern where female 
psychologists have in the past 15 years begun to dominate the field in terms of their 
overall numbers, thereby corresponding well to Richter and Griesel's (1999) findings 
demonstrating the feminization of psychology post 1999 (cited in Pillay & Kramers, 
2003). 
Figure 3 
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Moreover, from Figure 3 it can be seen that when race is cross-tabulated with gender, 
male psychologists closely followed the number of female psychologists according to 
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their race group. However, this pattern could not be analysed for the Coloured and Indian 
respondents who were represented solely by females and males respectively. 
Figure 4 
Racial composition of sample by years in practice. 
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From Figures 3 and 4, findings indicate the effect that Apartheid has had on the training 
of psychologists (Mayekiso, Strydom, Jithoo & Katz, 2004), as in this sample White 
psychologists dominate the field enormously. Of import, the residual effects of an 
exclusionary educational system continue to be evident in the last 10 years whereby 
Black, Indian and Coloured psychologists' numbers significantly trail those of White 
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psychologists. Recent published research indicates that approximately 18% of currently 
registered South African psychologists are Black, with White psychologists representing 
82%o of the whole (HPCSA 2004 records cited in Duncan, Van Niekerk & Townsend, 
2004). Unfortunately, comparisons are difficult to make with this data set as it is not 
known what percentage of Duncan et al.'s sample were registered as clinical 
psychologists. Overall however, the racial profile of this sample corresponds with theirs. 
However, it goes without saying that these findings are not only lamentable, but are in 
sharp contrast to the current South African population, where proportions of the different 
population groups are 9.2% for Whites, 79.5% for Blacks, 2.5% for Indians, and 8.9% for 
Coloureds (Statistics South Africa, 2006). Therefore, in contrast to South Africa's 
population, this sample's race representation is inverted. 
Table 5 
Cross-tabulation of gender by highest degree obtained. 
Deg ree 
Gender Masters PhD Total 
n % n % 
Male 17 26 12 18.7 29 
Female 29 45 4 6 33 




The respondents' qualifications revealed that 72% had the required minimum of a 
Masters degree in clinical psychology and 25% had PhD degrees (see Table 5). Thus, 
although all respondents had a Masters degree, male respondents were three times more 
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likely to have PhDs than women. It was not ascertained whether the PhDs were in 
psychology, however. 
Table 6 
Frequencies of year in which highest degree was obtained. 
Year obtained 




Valid 1958 1 1.6 1.6 1.6 
1974 1 1.6 1.6 3.2 
1978 1 1.6 1.6 4.8 
1980 3 4.7 4.8 9.7 
1981 3 4.7 4.8 15 
1983 2 3.1 3.2 18 
1984 2 3.1 3.2 21 
1985 1 1.6 1.6 23 
1986 3 4.7 4.8 27 
1987 4 6.3 6.5 34 
1988 1 1.6 1.6 35 
1990 2 3.1 3.2 39 
1991 1 1.6 1.6 40 
1992 1 1.6 1.6 42 
1993 4 6.3 6.5 48 
1994 3 4.7 4.8 53 
1995 3 4.7 4.8 58 
1996 1 1.6 1.6 60 
1997 3 4.7 4.8 65 
1998 5 7.8 8.1 73 
1999 3 4.7 4.8 77 
2000 4 6.3 6.5 84 
2001 4 6.3 6.5 90 
2002 2 3.1 3.2 94 
2005 3 4.7 4.8 98 
2006 1 1.6 1.6 100 
Total 62 97 100 
Missing System 2 3.1 
Total 64 100 
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The mean year in which this sample graduated with their highest degree was 1992, with a 
median score of 1994 and a modal value of 1998 (see Table 6). The range of years 
between the oldest and most recent graduation was 48 years (SD = 9.04 years). 
Table 7 
Frequency representation of graduating universities (ranked). 




Pretoria 9 14.1 14.5 14.5 
Rhodes 7 10.9 11.3 25.8 
WITS 5 7.8 8.1 33.9 
UCT 5 7.8 8.1 42 
Stellenbosch 5 7.8 8.1 50.1 
OFS 5 7.8 8.1 58.2 
UNISA 4 6.3 6.5 64.7 
UKZN (Westville) 4 6.3 6.5 71.2 
RAU 4 6.3 6.5 77.7 
UPE 3 4.7 4.8 82.5 
United States 2 3.1 3.2 85.7 
North West 2 3.1 3.2 88.9 
UKZN (PMB) 2 3.1 3.2 92.1 
Zululand 1.6 1.6 93.7 
UWC 1.6 1.6 95.3 
Potchefstroom 1.6 1.6 96.9 
MEDUNSA 1.6 1.6 98.5 
Johannesburg 1.6 1.6 100 










Table 7 depicts the universities from which the sample graduated with their highest 
degree. Most of the respondents graduated from Pretoria, followed in rank order by 
Rhodes, with ties between UCT, WITS and the University of the Orange Free State. Two 
respondents obtained their highest qualification in the United States of America. The 
data suggests that the sample reflects a reasonable spread of South Africa's training 
universities, although no data was available against which representative proportionality 
could be determined. 
Although respondents were asked to indicate only their primary work setting and 
therapeutic orientation (Figures 5 and 6 respectively), it became clear that most of the 
sample selected several of the options available to them. In order to avoid double 
counting the data because psychologists selected more than one option for primary work 
setting, only the setting indicated by the participant where most work was derived from 
was selected. Those who selected more than one option for their primary therapeutic 
orientation were coded as 'eclectic'. 
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Figure 5 
Number of psychologists by primary work settings. 




























Not unexpectedly, Figure 5 demonstrates that private practice far outweighed any other 
work setting at a percentage of 67.2%. This is similar to Louw and Allan's (1998) 
findings for forensic psychologists wherein private practitioners accounted for two thirds 
of their sample. The next most common area of practice was 'other' at 11%. However, 
no specification was requested/made as to what this entailed. Student Counselling 
closely followed 'other' at 9%. Other areas of practice were: provincial hospital at 6%, 
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community at 3%, and the South African Police Service and private hospital both at 
1.6%. No participant selected 'academic' as their primary work setting, although some 
respondents indicated that this formed part of their professional responsibilities. 
Figure 6 

























In terms of therapeutic orientation (Figure 6), the eclectic mode (69%) was followed by 
psychodynamic therapies (19%) representing just over a quarter of the respondents and 
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cognitive behavioural therapy at 6% of the sample. Client Centred, 'Other' and Systemic 
were poorly represented in this sample at 3%, and 1.5% respectively. 
Statistically significant correlations were found. Those who worked in the field marked 
"other' had less practice years experience (r = -0.256, p<0.05) than other work settings. 
Those experienced in criminal cases were more likely to be found working for Student 
Counselling Centres (r = 0.302, p<0.05). An explanation for the prevalence of 
practitioners working in Student Counselling Centres having processed more criminal 
cases may be that part of their professional responsibility is as academic psychologists. 
Those who worked in private practice were less likely to practice Client Centred 
therapies (r = -0.257, p<0.05) in contrast to those working in Provincial Hospitals (r = 
0.325, p<0.05) and Student Counselling Centres who seemed to favour this approach (r = 
0.250, p<0.05). Practitioners working in the Provincial Hospital realm approached 
significance in being less likely to practice eclectic therapies (r = -0.244, p<0.05). 
4.2 RELIABILITY OF IDA-R SCALE 
Although no reliability data could be found in Skeem and Golding's (2001) original 
publication, a reliability coefficient was tabulated on the 32 point IDA-R scale. The 
IDA-R scale produced a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.495 which is a disappointingly low 
reliability coefficient for social science research (Durrheim, 1999c). 
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4.3 RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
This section explored whether clinical psychologists would differ in their opinions of the 
insanity defence as measured by the IDA-R scale scores for each individual (Skeem & 
Evans-DeCicco, 2004). The variable addressed in this section was the individual 
aggregate IDA-R scale score. Respondents were asked to complete a Likert scale 
questionnaire which consisted of 32 statements about the insanity defence, mental illness 
and criminal responsibility. They were given 7 response choices which ranged on a 
continuum from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix B). Moreover, the 
final question asked if the respondent had any difficulty completing the questionnaire 
because they could not "conceive of anyone who would not be responsible for their 
criminal actions" (p. 186). Each questionnaire was allocated a score between 17 and 119 
derived from the scoring key developed by the authors. 
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Figure 7 
Overall representation of aggregate individual Insanity Defence Scale Scores. 
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The IDA-R scale scores3 are depicted in Figure 7. All except one respondent had no 
trouble completing the scale because they could not conceive of a person not being held 
responsible for their actions. 
If one takes the midway point between the IDA-R scale score's lower (17) and upper (119) limits, the 
average score obtainable is 68. In order to establish cut-off points for interpretation of the scores, this study 
assumes that on a continuum, scores above 68 denote low support for the insanity defence, graduating 
toward negative opinions. Scores between 17 and 37 denote strong support for the defence, scores between 
38 and 47 demonstrate moderate support, and scores between 48 and the midpoint of 68 suggest some 
ambivalence about the defence. 
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Although at first glance the overall distribution in Figure 7 is considered to be 
approaching a normal distribution curve, if the midway point is held at 67, this sample's 
opinions are negatively skewed denoting that most (90.6%, n = 58) were generally in 
favour of the insanity defence. 
Table 8 
Frequencies and interpretation of aggregate individual IDA-R scale scores. 
Scores Interpretation Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent  
17-37 Strong support 
38-47 Moderate support 
48 - 68 Ambivalent support 
69 - 87 Ambivalent opposition 
88-97 Moderate opposition 
98 - 119 Strong opposition 
Total  
N=6A 
However, when breaking the scores down even further (Table 8), it becomes clear that 
23.4% (n= 15) strongly supported the defence, whilst 34.4% (n = 22) are moderately in 
favour, and 32.8% (n = 21) were fairly ambivalent about the insanity defence. Negative 
attitudes were held by 9.4% (n = 6) of the sample. The mean, mode and median were 
47.01, 42 and 45 respectively, with a range of 66 (SD = 13.81). The measures of central 
tendency were clustered in the moderately favourable portion of the scale. 
15 23.4 23.4 
22 34.4 57.8 
21 32.8 90.6 





A statistically significant correlation was found between lower support for the insanity 
defence and the belief that much reform of the insanity defence was needed (r = .256, 
/K0.05). 
Thus, although this sample showed a broad range of opinions about the insanity defence, 
the majority were in favour, with a small percentage exhibiting negative views. However, 
it should be noted that the range of the scale scores was broad, ranging between 20 and 
86. Not unexpectedly, respondents who showed less support for the insanity defence also 
felt that it needed to be reformed. 
4.4 RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
This section inquired whether there would be a significant association between individual 
aggregate IDA-R scale scores and the demographic variables of gender, race or age. 
Respondents were asked to complete a demographic data sheet attached to the IDA-R 
questionnaire. The data sheet requested details on gender, race and age as part of the 
exploratory aims of this research. The first variable to be considered was gender. 
Table 9 
Mann-Whitney UTest between gender and IDA-R scale scores. 
IDA-R Scale Scores 
Mann-Whitney U 323.500 
Wilcoxon W 758.500 
Z -2.188 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .029* 





Mann-Whitney U Test mean ranks of IDA-R scale scores by gender. 
IDA-R Scale Scores 
Gender _n Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Male 29 26.15517241 758.5 
Female 33 36.1969697 1194.5 
Total 62 
N=62 
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to compute the IDA-R scale scores by gender. As 
can be deduced from Table 9, there was a statistically significant gender difference in 
perceptions of the insanity defence, with z at -2.188 and U at 323.500 measured at an 
alpha level of 0.05. Moreover, this test showed that the sum of average ranks for female 
psychologists' IDA-R scale scores was greater than for male psychologists (see Table 
10). 
Having considered the association between gender and the IDA-R scale scores, race will 
now be examined. 
Table 11 
Chi-Square Test between race and IDA-R scales scores. 










a 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 15.0. 
b 38 cells (100.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell 
frequency is 1.7. 
p<Q).Q5 
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Race by IDA-R scale scores were tabulated using the Chi-Square test for nominal data 
depicted in Table 11. Bearing in mind that the Coloured and Indian samples had 
frequencies less than 5, no significant associations between any of the race groups' 
opinions about the insanity defence were found. 
Table 12 
Means, standard deviations and ranges of IDA-R scale scores by gender and race. 
Male Female 
Race Group Mean n SD Range Mean N_ SD Range 
White 43.61 23 16.16 86 50.76 25 15.11 60 
Black 40.33 3 4.16 8 48 4 19.41 38 
Coloured 44.5 2 7.77 11 
Indian 37 2 1.41 2 
Total 44.37 27 12.38 59 50 31 15.01 60 
JV=58 
For the purposes of the exploratory nature of this research, Table 12 further examined the 
data by breaking down the individual aggregate IDA-R score composition by race and 
gender. Measures of central tendency demonstrate that female psychologists as a whole, 
regardless of race, supported the insanity defence less than their male cohorts. Here the 
mean score for female psychologists was 50 (SD = 15.01) denoting favourable, but fairly 
ambivalent attitudes. Moreover, within this group, White female clinical psychologists 
had the highest scores (50.76), followed in rank order by Black (48) and then Coloured 
(44.5) respondents, indicating that White and Black female respondents fell in the 
ambivalent, but supportive range, with the Coloured respondents in the moderately 
supportive range. Of interest, when considering male psychologists, the ordering of 
scores by race was replicated, albeit with slightly lower scores. An overview of these 
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scores demonstrates broader standard deviations and ranges, with, again, White 
respondents representing higher scores denoting lower support. Here mean scores for 
male psychologists was 43.61 for Whites, 40.33 for Blacks, and 37 for the Indian 
respondents. Thus, the male Indian respondents were moderately in favour of the 
insanity defence, with their White and Black cohorts falling in the favourable, but 
ambivalent range. 
Having found no significant relationship between race and IDA-R scores, the association 
between age of respondents and IDA-R scale scores was examined. 
Table 13 
Pearson Correlations between age and IDA-R Scale Scores. 
Age IDA-R Scale Score 
Age Pearson Correlation 1 -.110 
Sig. (2-tailed) .393 





Sig. (2-tailed) .393 
N 62 64 
/?<0.05 
Pearson's r was used to measure the relationship between age and individual aggregate 
IDA-R scale scores. As can be seen in Table 13, this result was not found to be 
statistically significant. This means that age as a variable did not have any significant 
bearing on IDA-R scores. 
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In sum, this section found that gender may have some bearing on opinions towards the 
insanity defence. Specifically, female respondents generally supported the insanity 
defence less than their male counterparts, regardless of race. No significant relationship 
was found between race or age, and IDA-R scale scores. 
4.5 RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
This section explored whether there would be a significant association between 
individual aggregate IDA-R scale scores and clinical psychologists' therapeutic 
orientation or work setting. Respondents were requested to select their primary 
therapeutic orientation and primary work setting on the demographic data sheet attached 
to the IDA-R scale questionnaire4. Respondents were given a range of choices to select 
for both variables, with an option for 'other' should the list not cover their primary work 
setting or therapeutic orientation (see Appendix A). 
Separate correlation coefficients were calculated for each of the therapeutic orientations 
and areas of practice. Positive correlations show lack of support for the insanity 
defence because the higher the score, the lower the support. The first variable to be 
addressed is therapeutic orientation. 
Although respondents were asked to indicate only their primary work setting and therapeutic orientation 
(Figures 5 and 6 respectively), it became clear that most of the sample selected several of the options 
available to them. In order to avoid double counting the data, where psychologists selected more than one 
option for primary work setting, the setting indicated by the participant where most work was derived from 




Pearson Correlations between IDA-R scale scores and primary therapeutic orientation. 
















It can be seen from Table 14 that respondents who practiced psychodynamic therapies 
showed statistically significantly less support for the insanity defence. However, the 
correlation was relatively weak. 
Table 15 
Means, medians and standard deviations of IDA-R Scale Scores by primary therapeutic 
orientation. 
Primary therapeutic orientation Mean Median n SD 
Psychodynamic 54.33 52 12 15.68 
Systemic 42 42 1 
CBT 36 36 4 9.01 
Client Centred 49.5 49.5 2 14.84 
Eclectic 45.88 43 44 13.2 
Other 59 59 1 
N=64 
Scrutiny of the IDA-R mean and median scores by therapeutic orientation (Table 15) 
showed that those practicing CBT strongly supported the insanity defence. Those who 
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chose eclectic and systemic therapies as their primary modality scored within the 
moderate support range. Those practicing client centred and psychodynamic therapies 
were found to be in the ambivalent, but favourable range. 
Having considered the possible relationship between therapeutic orientations and IDA-R 
scale scores, primary areas of practice will now be considered. 
Table 16 
Pearson Correlations between IDA-R scale scores and primary work setting. 
Primary work setting IDA-R Scale Scores 
Private Practice 0.151 
Community setting -0.087 
Hospital - Provincial or Government -0.077 
Hospital - Private -0.185 
University/College Counselling Centre -0.030 
South African Police Service 0.183 
Other -0.090  
^<0.05 
7V=64 
When considering the IDA-R scale score by primary work setting no significant results 
were found when using Pearson correlations, demonstrating that no relationship was 




Means, medians and standard deviations oflDA-R Scale Scores by primary work setting. 
Primary work setting Mean Median N SD 
Private Practice 48.55 45 43 14.41 
Community setting 40.5 40.5 2 13.43 
Hospital - Provincial or Government 43 44.5 4 14.3 
Hospital - Private 27 27 1 
University/College Counselling Centre 45.83 45.5 6 12.78 
South African Police Service 67 67 1 
Other 43.57 39 7 9.58 
7V=64 
Table 17 sets out the mean and median IDA-R scale scores by primary work setting in 
order to illustrate the direction in which opinions lay. Results indicate that for the SAPS 
respondent, there was ambivalent support for the insanity defence, just falling within the 
favourable range. Conversely, the sole respondent working in the private hospital setting 
scored in the strong support category. Those respondents working in community, 
provincial hospitals and 'other' settings were moderately supportive of the insanity 
defence. The bulk of respondents representing private practice fell within the lower 
parameters of 'ambivalent support'. However, these findings show that, bar the SAPS 
and private hospital respondents, the mean and median scores were relatively similar, 
falling in the moderate support to ambivalent range, although with broader standard 
deviations. 
In brief, these results show that, albeit with weak but significant correlations, 
practitioners of psychodynamic therapies had less support for the insanity defence than 
their non-psychodynamic colleagues. For the work setting variable, no statistically 
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significant relationship was found between any of the primary work settings and opinions 
about the insanity defence. 
4.6 RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR 
This section explored whether there was a significant association between IDA-R scores 
and clinical psychologists who had more practice experience, forensic experience and 
who had processed more criminal cases. Respondents were requested to complete this 
information on the data sheet attached to the IDA-R questionnaire (Appendix A). These 
three variables have been grouped under the heading of experience and are addressed 
below. 
Table 18 
Pearson Correlations between IDA-R scale scores and experience. 
Experience IDA-R Scale Scores 
Years in practice -0.095 
Years of forensic experience -0.189 
Numbers of criminal cases processed 0.091  
/?<0.05 
N=6A 
The Pearson r correlations (Table 18) did not field any statistically significant scores in 
terms of this sample's experience, demonstrating no strong opinions for or against the 
insanity defence by those with more professional experience. 
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In sum, this section attempted to establish a relationship between individual aggregate 
IDA-R scale scores and experience in psychological or psycholegal practice. The results 
show no statistical relationship between opinions about the insanity defence and practice 
and forensic experience, or number of criminal cases processed. 
4.7 INCIDENTAL QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THIS RESEARCH 
Without being solicited, 14 (22%) of the respondents added hand-written comments on 
their questionnaires. Of these, 8 were women and 6 were men. This was an 
unanticipated source of qualitative information for this study. A description of the 
comments is included to augment the quantitative results. 
One respondent who had much practice (25 years) and forensic experience (20 years) and 
had processed many forensic cases (n = 150) stated the following: 
For the insanity defence to work we need: 
(1) Adequate mental health facilities for referral. Current state mental health 
facilities are very poor, poorly staffed, inadequate 'meds' etc. Without this 
follow through, is [as] good as incarceration i.e. no effective treatment? 
(2) Legal system also needs to function effectively - long time awaiting trail 
likely to increase incidence of mental illness. 
(3) There is inadequate understanding of fundamental points of M'Naghten 
Rule among mental health professionals and specialist evidence. 
These sentiments were reinforced by another respondent who noted that "lack of 
sufficient state facilities forces psychiatric personnel to discharge patients despite their 
professional belief that more care is needed". This underscores a different comment 
which stated that there "was room for improvement" of the insanity defence, and that 
"not many but some" mental health professionals were irresponsible in discharging 
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potentially dangerous patients. Moreover, it was noted by one of the younger female 
respondents that "[fjhis questionnaire does not discuss rehabilitative care for those who 
meet the criteria for 'insanity' but should still be held accountable. The problem is that in 
a country lacking resources and facilities of care we are stuck in a deadlock of insanity 
release versus prison" (sic). 
Another female psychologist stated: 
While completing this, I thought of people suffering from severe psychotic 
disturbances and think that the defense is important for these people. 
I would not view certain Personality Disorders (eg. Anti-social or Borderline) 
with the same empathy or sympathy in terms of the sanity defence (sic). 
Some respondents (n = 10) equivocated over some questions adding comments as 
qualifying statements to their response. These comments raised the possibility of sane 
killers abusing the insanity defence to their own advantage. Of interest, one qualifying 
statement inferred that mental health practitioners in private practice were more likely to 
invent a mental illness to facilitate a successful insanity plea. Another argued that 
lawyers "in some cases" encourage their clients to lie to appear insane. Another 
questioned whether lack of responsibility for taking medication may aggravate as 
opposed to mitigate criminal capacity. 
Some of the annotated comments {n = 5) related to complaints about the IDA-R scale 
being "extremely limited" and the questions being ambiguous and the "objectionable" 
use of language such as "crazy". Furthermore, another criticism was that some 
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respondents felt they did not have the requisite statistics or experience to give an 
informed answer. 
Some respondents (n = 3) pointed out that research employing the use of a questionnaire 
without opportunities for qualitative comments "simplifies" the responses and did not 
allow for "in-depth views" or "real discussion of the issue". Other methodological 
criticisms related to some questions having more than one variable (n = 2). Another 
respondent found it difficult to complete the questionnaire because it had "very loaded 
questions and it is extremely difficult to generalize without a case at hand". 
A valid criticism of the demographic data sheet was that the researcher did not qualify 
what was meant by 'number of criminal cases processed' whereby a respondent had 
"seen 100+ forensic orientated cases" and was not sure if these qualified. 
Six of the respondents wished the researcher success in her endeavours. 
4.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Overall, 12.8% of the 500 psychologists canvassed responded to this survey. This is 
considered a disappointingly low response rate (Yammarino et al., 1991). 
This sample of clinical psychologists (N= 64) was almost equal with respect to gender. 
There were however great disparities in terms of race, with White psychologists 
representing the majority of the respondents. Although, this is in line with recent HPCSA 
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statistics on registered psychologists by race group (Duncan et al., 2004). The average 
age of this sample was 48 years, with most respondents graduating in 1992. The 
University of training most cited was Pretoria followed by Rhodes University. Moreover, 
male psychologists were three times more likely to have a PhD than female 
psychologists. 
Professional experience was measured in terms of years in practice, years of forensic 
experience and number of criminal cases processed. Broad ranges were evident, with 
mean years for practice years and forensic years, 15.17 years and 6.42 years respectively. 
Whereas 39% (n = 25) of the sample had not processed any criminal cases, only 7% (n = 
5) had experience with over 100 cases. The respondent who had processed the most 
cases (n = 1000+) was a female clinical psychologist. 
In terms of therapeutic orientation, most practiced eclectic modalities, followed by 
psychodynamic therapy. The primary work setting was private practice, followed by 
'other' which was not specified. 
The reliability coefficient of the ID A-R scale was found to be 0.495 (Cronbach's Alpha). 
This is considered to be relatively low reliability for social science research (Durrheim, 
1999c). 
The range of ID A-R scale scores was broad (66) with individual aggregate scores ranging 
from 20 to 86. Although most respondents were in favour of the insanity defence, whilst 
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32.8% had relatively ambivalent opinions. Results exploring the relationship between 
IDA-R scale scores and gender suggest that female psychologists showed less support for 
the insanity defence than the male respondents. However, this result needs to be 
confirmed by a much larger sample to verify that they are not the result of chance. 
No statistically significant relationship was found between opinions about the insanity 
defence and the demographic variables of age, race and primary work setting. A 
statistically significant but weak correlation was found between respondents who 
practiced psychodynamic therapy and low support for the insanity defence. No 
relationship was found between the IDA-R scale scores and those who had more practice 
and forensic years, or who had processed more criminal cases. However, it is recognised 
that more research is needed to verify these results. 
Having presented the results of this research, the implications and limitations of these 




Despite methodological shortcomings, several subtle findings were extrapolated from this 
study. However, it should be noted that since no previous research could be found on 
psychologists' opinions of the insanity defence some difficulty was encountered in 
relating the findings to the literature. 
5.1 An overview of the IDA-R scale scores 
The distribution of this sample's individual aggregate IDA-R scale scores warrants the 
following comments. Firstly, the reliability of the scale was shown to be poor in this 
sample. No reliability data could be ascertained from the authors of the scale on their 
original sample. Considering that this scale was designed for the lay public, the author 
anticipated pronounced negatively skewed results depicting clear support for the insanity 
defence. However, the findings show an approximated normal distribution curve, albeit 
leaning slightly toward the lower end of the scale scores, and thus support for the insanity 
defence. Consequently, although the prediction that clinical psychologists would be 
supportive of the insanity defence was borne out by the overall findings, the broad range 
in scale scores was unanticipated. These results demonstrate that this sample's continuum 
of opinions may overlap that of the lay public (Skeem & Golding, 2001), albeit skewed 
more positively to the defence. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the range of this 
sample's clinical psychologists' opinions points to some ambivalence about the insanity 
defence. 
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Skeem and Golding (2001) cite research which demonstrates that the lay public have 
intuitive as opposed to accurate understandings of the legal definition of insanity. This 
assertion, viewed in conjunction with Allan and Louw's (2001) research on 
psychologists' lack of knowledge and experience in the forensic setting, may be an 
explanation for this sample's moderate to ambivalent supportive opinions of the insanity 
defence. Indeed, this was exemplified by one participant who found it difficult to 
complete the questionnaire because of his/her own lack of knowledge about the insanity 
defence. Moreover, putative abuse of the insanity defence by 'sane' criminals and 
members of the legal and mental health professions found quite strong expression in the 
annotated comments. Thus, it may be inferred that this sample's relatively broad range of 
opinions are not only similar to lay public opinion, but possibly erroneous regarding the 
perceived misuse of the defence. 
5.1.2 IDA-R scale scores and the demographic variables of gender, race and age 
Race and age were not found to be statistically associated with opinions of the insanity 
defence. When considering gender, the results suggest that female psychologists 
supported the defence less than the male respondents. 
That female psychologists' scores leant in a negatively biased direction is noteworthy 
because it broadly corresponds with Skeem and Golding's (2001) findings. A possible 
explanation for the slightly higher scores for women is located in research by Wahl 
(1995) and Ryan (1998) who explored the correlates between gender and crime (cited in 
Skeem & Golding, 2001). Their aggregate findings suggest that women as a group feel 
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vulnerable because the media depict women not only as targets, but victims of violent 
crime, particularly at the hands of 'madmen'. Indeed, in terms of prototype theory, it has 
been established that personal opinions are predicated on individual life experiences 
(Kempton, 1981, cited in Skeem & Golding, 2001). Thus, taking into account that this 
was a South African sample, more than likely familiar with violent crime, prototypes will 
plausibly be negatively biased. 
Skeem and Golding's (2001) research into jurors' perceptions of insanity provides this 
study with important pointers around the unfeasibility of individuals having impartial 
attitudes toward the insanity defence, insanity per se and crime. Clinical psychologists, 
as with Skeem and Golding's sample, will have their own "experience-based 'knowledge 
structures'" which will inform their opinions and thus are not blank slates (2001, p. 561). 
Moreover, clinical psychologists come from a broad mix of backgrounds and experience 
which facilitates their knowledge and understanding in their professional field, and 
likewise informs their worldview. 
5.1.3 IDA-R scale scores and primary work setting, and therapeutic orientation. 
Results seeking a relationship between primary work setting and opinions about the 
insanity defence were not statistically significant. This was also the case for relationships 
between opinions of the insanity defence and primary therapeutic orientation, except for 
those practicing psychodynamic therapies where a weak but statistically significant 
correlation was found. 
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From an exploratory point of view the general leaning of mean scores warrants the 
following discussion. The bulk of the mean scores for primary areas of practice and 
therapeutic orientation fell in the 'moderate' to 'ambivalent support' range. The 
preponderance of scores which were not in strong support of the insanity defence perhaps 
highlights one of the factors tested for in the IDA-R scale, namely, lack of faith in the 
criminal justice system (Skeem & Evans-DeCicco, 2004). In the light of this being a 
South African sample, perhaps it could be argued that contextual factors contribute 
towards ambivalent opinions. It is indisputable that South Africa's violent crime rate is 
high (Dissel, 2002, cited in Cohen, 2005) and that this might have negatively biased this 
sample's faith in the South African criminal justice system. It has been documented that 
violent crime has the effect of creating feelings of vulnerability, perceptions of an unsafe 
world, and distrust in the general community (Herman, 1992). Additionally, the 
deleterious effect of vicarious trauma on psychologists through treating victims of crime 
is being increasingly documented (Sexton, 1999). Thus, it is not unexpected that there is 
a direct correlation between the severity of the trauma and its psychological impact on 
individuals (Herman, 1992). Moreover, the fact that this sample is qualified in the field 
of clinical psychology does not preclude them from being victims of crime or have 
experienced vicarious trauma through their clients, or having conservative or biased 
opinions of social issues. 
An added explanation for results suggesting less support and ambivalent opinions of the 
insanity defence may lie in Allan and Louw (2001) and Louw and Allan's (1998) 
research on psychologists practicing in South Africa's forensic realm. Their findings 
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suggest that clinical psychologists did not have the requisite training in forensic 
psychology to adequately execute their duties injudicial settings. Indeed, those 
psychologists canvassed reported that very little of their training was focused on forensic 
practice. Moreover, these results may suggest a convergence with Skeem and Golding's 
(2001) findings that very little is known, statistically, on the use of the insanity defence, 
and more specifically, possible abuses by 'sane' criminals. Considering that 45 % (n = 
29) of this sample had no forensic experience, a plausible explanation for ambivalent 
opinions of the insanity defence may be lack of experience in the forensic field and 
incorrect knowledge about the use and abuse of the insanity defence. However, it should 
be noted that the opposite was not established in this research, namely that those with 
forensic training and experience endorsed the insanity defence (see section 5.1.4 below). 
5.1.4 IDA-R scale scores and years of practice and forensic experience, and 
criminal cases processed 
No statistically significant result was found for those who had more experience, 
particularly in the forensic field, and their opinions of the insanity defence. It was 
anticipated that fairly strong opinions would be evident for this sub-group. This result 
could indicate ambivalence about the insanity defence, perhaps highlighting that in South 
Africa, or indeed internationally, this is a complex deliberation which denies clear cut 
answers. More especially, since it is expected that those with forensic experience have 
accurate, as opposed to intuitive, understandings of what it means to plead and be found 
not guilty by reason of insanity. Indeed, if psychologists working in the forensic field 
have ethical issues regarding indefinite institutional committal, their beliefs may not have 
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found expression in the IDA-R scale used. Therefore, it is considered imperative to 
accurately canvas, at a qualitative level, opinions regarding the entirety of the insanity 
defence. 
5.1.5 Incidental qualitative aspects 
In addition to completing the questionnaire, some (22%) of the respondents "offered 
unsolicited opinions on the insanity defence, mental illness, or the justice system" which 
unexpectedly replicated Skeem and Golding's (2001, p. 574) research results. This 
suggests that just over a fifth of the respondents from this study felt quite strongly about 
the insanity defence. Indeed, although there were some reservations about the misuse of 
the defence, the general consensus of the comments suggested empathy for offenders 
suffering from mental illness. 
Consequently, it is interesting to note that the qualitative comments on this study 
indicated that those who work in the criminal responsibility field feel that not only is 
structural reform needed, but that psychologists in general need a better understanding of 
forensic psychology. This concurs with Louw and Allan's (1998) earlier research on 
forensic psychologists. Additionally, the reference to the concern about putative 
dishonesty and/or irresponsibility on the part of some mental health and legal 
professionals underscores aspects of the IDA-R scale which was tested for, and which 
perhaps should be further explored in the South African context. 
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5.2 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This study had several limitations. The very low response rate (12.6%) did not provide a 
large enough sample to be able to generalise these results with confidence. Moreover, the 
reliability of the questionnaire was found to be relatively low which further contributes to 
difficulties in generalising these results to South African clinical psychologists in general. 
Additionally, although the gender of the respondents was well represented, with parity 
between males and females, it was poorly representative in terms of race. However, 
recent literature shows that the overall racial profile of psychologists has not changed 
much in the last 19 years (Mayekiso et al., 2004). Therefore, this sample's racial profile 
may roughly correspond with currently registered psychologists. However, the insanity 
defence is essentially about individuals who have been marginalized by their mental 
illness (Foucault cited in Finkel, 1988). Considering South Africa's racially inequitable 
past, it may have been valuable to specifically assess previously marginalized groups for 
their opinion (Mayekiso et al, 2004). 
The cost of purchasing the latest HPCSA list of registered psychologists was considered 
prohibitive. Therefore, the researcher resorted to using a 2002 list she had access to. 
However, in the light of both the 8% return to sender rate and 12.8% response rate, a 
more recent list would have improved the sample size. This would not only have 
reduced the return to sender rate, but possibly increased the overall response by a similar 
percentage. Moreover, it has been found that preliminary notification and following up 
of respondents can greatly enhance response rates (Yammarino et al., 1991), and this 
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practice could have improved the response to this survey. Unfortunately, due to the 
limited time frame no follow up was possible to facilitate a better response rate. 
Additionally, since no research has apparently been done in this area with clinical 
psychologists, it was difficult to construct a literature review which specifically addressed 
this professional population. Though more research has been done in the United States 
on lay people's perceptions of the insanity defence, accessing these publications was 
prohibitively expensive. 
A limitation pointed out by some respondents was that the questionnaire was too 
superficial and geared more for the lay public. This indicates that it may not have been 
sophisticated or sensitive enough to fully capture clinical psychologists' opinions, 
particularly those with experience in this area. Other criticisms related to the need to 
include a qualitative component which would provide a study with much more depth, 
allowing for more nuanced and varied responses (Jackson & Van Vlaenderen, 1994). 
Indeed, the Likert scale is very useful in obtaining an overview of general opinions, but it 
is recommended that these results could be augmented with qualitative research. 
Although sought from the authors, the validity and reliability of the IDA-R scale was not 
available for scrutiny, however when tested for in this study, reliability of the instrument 
was found to be relatively low. 
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5.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, it should be noted that this study's small sample size and some 
confounding variables require these results to be considered with some caution, and that 
the generalisability of these results is tentative. 
Overall, the findings show that clinical psychologists' attitudes were predominantly 
moderately in support of the insanity defence. This was closely followed by ambivalent 
support, and a smaller percentage denoting strong support. Few IDA-R scale scores were 
negative in opinion. Although the scale used was criticized by some of the respondents, 
it is noteworthy that for this sample of clinical psychologists, opinions about the insanity 
defence largely overlapped with those of the lay public examined by Skeem and Golding 
(2001). This indicates that the opinions of a proportion of this sample are likely to 
converge with lay opinion. 
Moreover, this study's results suggest that female psychologists as a group, regardless of 
race, favour the insanity defence less than male psychologists. However, this should be 
empirically tested with a larger sample to validate whether this is an accurate reflection of 
female psychologists' opinions of the insanity defence, and not due to a chance result. 
Possible explanations for moderate to ambivalent support for the insanity defence are 
various. The most likely explanation concurs with Skeem and Golding's (2001) findings 
of lack of knowledge about the use of the insanity defence. This underscores findings 
from Louw and Allan (1998) which demonstrated lack of training and forensic 
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knowledge on the part of South African psychologists, some of whom practice in the 
forensic realm. Moreover, South Africa's high crime rate may have negatively biased 
respondents' opinions of the criminal justice system, and by implication the merits of the 
insanity defence. 
No relationship was established between opinions of the insanity defence and age or race 
variables. Moreover, no clear statistically significant result was established between 
opinions of the insanity defence, and primary work setting. A statistically significant 
result suggests that there is a correlation between those who practice psychodynamic 
therapies and low support for the insanity defence. However, it is recommended that this 
result be verified with a larger sample with more statistical power and an instrument with 
better reliability. No further significant results were established for the remaining 
therapeutic orientations. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that those with more practice and forensic experience did 
not differ significantly from those respondents who did not have the equivalent 
experience. This result is perplexing to the researcher, as Skeem and Golding's (2001) 
findings suggest that lack of forensic knowledge generally was equated with more 
negative opinions on the insanity defence. Therefore, this research expected to find the 
converse for those equipped with psycholegal experience. Thus, more in depth 
qualitative investigation is indicated for psychologists with forensic experience and their 
opinions of the insanity defence. 
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Considering that most of the results were rather tenuous, more focused research should be 
conducted in future with a larger sample to facilitate greater statistical reliability. 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Considering that this was an exploratory study researching a topic which, to the author's 
knowledge, is unresearched in South Africa to date, there are several ways to improve 
future research into this area. 
Qualitative research would enhance a more comprehensive approach to determining 
much more varied and nuanced aspects (Jackson & Van Vlaenderen, 1994) of clinical 
psychologists' attitudes about the insanity defence in the South African context. 
Indeed, perhaps a validated and reliable data collection tool should be designed for future 
research of this topic which takes into account previous research done on South African 
forensic psychologists (Louw & Allan, 1998) and the South African milieu. Moreover, 
an up to date HPCSA list of South African registered psychologists will probably 
facilitate a better response rate. A better response rate would have improved the 
statistical power of the sample and the results established therein. Additionally, a 
reminder to respondents is generally reported to be effective in increasing response rates 
(Yammarino et al., 1991). 
In the light of the results of this sample suggesting that there may be differences in 
opinion of the insanity defence by gender, and that opinions may differ according to 
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therapeutic orientation, further quantitative and qualitative research is warranted to verify 
and explore these results. 
An avenue of future research in South Africa would be to explore differences of opinion 
of the insanity defence between clinical and counselling psychologists, and perhaps in 
contrast to psychiatrists. Moreover, it may be fruitful to replicate Skeem and Golding's 
(2001) research with the lay public and assess whether there are significant differences 
between lay public and mental health professionals' attitudes. 
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I understand the nature and purposes of this study and am participating freely and voluntarily. I 
understand that by completing the anonymous questionnaire below I have indicated my consent to 
participate. 
Demographic details. (Please tick/complete where applicable). 
Gender: Male Female 
Age: Race: 
Under apartheid reference to race was generally seen as offensive. For this study race is a variable of academic 
interest only. 
Years in practice: 
Years of forensic experience: 
Number of criminal forensic cases you have processed: 
Qualifications. (Please complete). 
Highest Degree obtained 
Year obtained 
Name of University 







Primary work setting. (Please tick where applicable). 
Private practice 
Community setting 
Hospital - Provincial or Government 
Hospital - Private 







Attitudes Toward The Insanity Defence (Skeem & Evans-DeCicco, 2004). 
For each statement below, please ring the choice that reflects your attitude, using the scale: 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 
4 = neutral, 5 = slightly agree, 6 = moderately agree, 7 = strongly agree. 
1. I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their mental 
condition. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
2. It is not necessarily wrong to punish someone for something they did under the influence of 
irrational experiences that they could not control. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
3. I do not believe that the insanity defence* sends a message to average criminals that they 
can escape punishment. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
4. For the right price, psychiatrists or psychologists will probably manufacture a "mental 
illness" for any criminal to convince the court that he is insane. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
5. I believe that we should punish a person for a criminal act only if he understood the act as 
evil and then freely chose to do it. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
6. I believe that all human beings know what they are doing and have the power to control 
themselves. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
7. The insanity defence* is a necessary element in our legal system. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
8. The insanity defence* threatens public safety by telling criminals that they can get away 
with a crime if they come up with a good story about why they did it. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
9. Most people who are found "not guilty by reason of insanity" really are insane. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
10. I believe that mental illness can impair people's ability to make logical choices and control 
themselves. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
11. A defendant's degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he commits the crime, then he should do 
the time. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
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12. The insanity defence* returns disturbed, dangerous people to the streets. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
13. Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have failed to exert enough willpower to behave 
properly like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like everyone else. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
14. As a last resort, defence attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie 
through their teeth in order to appear "insane". 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
15. Severe mental illness suggests a reduced ability to make wise decisions, to form criminal 
intents, and to act in accordance with the law. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
16. Perfectly sane killers can get away with their crimes by hiring expensive lawyers and 
experts who misuse the insanity defence*. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
17. The insanity plea is a loophole in the law that allows too many guilty people to escape 
punishment. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
18. The insanity defence* should be abolished. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
19. Most insane offenders are released from custody only when they no longer pose any 
significant threat of harm. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
20. We should punish people who commit criminal acts, regardless of their degree of mental 
disturbance. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
21. It is wrong to punish people who commit crime for crazy reasons while gripped by 
uncontrollable hallucinations or delusions. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
22. Most defendants who use the insanity defence* are truly mentally ill, not fakers. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
23. Few criminals actually "get off' by using the insanity defence*. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
24. People who do wrong may well suffer from chemical imbalances or bad parenting. But 
holding them responsible for their actions is the only thing that will make them behave 
properly. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
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25. Some people with severe mental illness are out of touch with reality and do not understand 
that their acts are wrong. These people cannot be blamed and do not deserve to be 
punished. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
26. Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists or psychologists see fit to return to the streets 
go on to kill again. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
27. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use the insanity defence* to wangle 
his way to freedom. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree 
28. It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit because of any uncontrollable illness, 
whether it be epilepsy or mental illness. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. The insanity defence* needs a lot of reform. 
Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
30. How strongly do you feel about the insanity defence*? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
31. How personally important is your opinion on the insanity defence*? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
32. How much do you care about the insanity defence*? 






Did you have trouble completing this checklist because you cannot conceive of anyone who would not 
be responsible for their criminal actions? 
No Yes 
* The use of the term 'insanity defence' is a colloquial one. In South African courts the term is more 
correctly referred to as pathological criminal incapacity, or temporary non-pathological criminal 
incapacity. 
The authors have kindly allowed for their measure to not be copyrighted for the purposes of 
research. 
Skeem, J. & Evans-DeCicco, J. (2004). Attitudes toward the insanity defense. In L.S. Wrightsman, 




,?*jtf> , \ * 
C 
4»& 
6 ^ i r& 
o i ^ 
APPENDIX C 




Phone: +27 33 2605853 
Fax: +27 33 2605809 UNIVERSITY OF 
KWAZULU-NATAL 
15 May 2006 
Dear Colleague, 
Invitation to Participate in Clinical Forensic Psychology Research 
The attached anonymous questionnaire forms part of a research study for the requirements of my 
Masters degree in Clinical Psychology. This research is interested in perceptions of clinical 
psychologists regarding the 'insanity defence'* under South African criminal law and whether 
psychologists have firm opinions on the merits and ethics of this defence. This is an important area of 
research as increasingly clinical psychologists are being called upon to assist the courts in forensic 
matters. Although Section 77 of the Criminal Procedures Act is fairly straightforward regarding fitness 
to stand trial; Section 78 is much more complicated, relating to the legal definitions and procedural 
aspects of the 'insanity defence'*. 
It would be much appreciated if you could assist me by completing this questionnaire which should 
take you about 10 minutes. Included is a postage-paid reply envelope. If you are unable to complete 
the questionnaire I would nevertheless be grateful if you would return the blank questionnaire and 
simply mark it 'incomplete'. 
You have been randomly chosen from the HPCSA's list of registered clinical psychologists. No 
identifying markers are attached to the questionnaire and therefore data analysis will not reflect any 
individual submissions. 
The final outcome of this study is that this dissertation will be lodged in the UKZN library at the 
Pietermaritzburg campus, and it is hoped that the standard will be high enough to be published in a peer 
reviewed journal. Should you wish to be informed of the key findings of this research, please email me 
the request so as not to affect the anonymity of your questionnaire. 
Your contribution to this study is greatly valued. I would be most grateful if you could complete 
and return the questionnaire before the 15th July 2006. 
Thanks and regards 
Ms P I Styles (Clinical Psychology Intern) Supervised by: Prof D R Wassenaar 
083 482 6005 / 031 -765 7831 (a/h) linical Psychologist 
tritonia@telkomsa.net Wassenaartgukzn.ac.za 
* The use of the term 'insanity defence' is a colloquial one. In South African courts the term is more correctly referred to as pathological criminal 
incapacity, or temporary non-pathological criminal incapacity. 
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APPENDIX D 
Scoring Key: Injustice and Danger 
Record your scores Reverse the scores for the 
For the following: following (that is, change 7 














Scores can range from 17 to 119. A high score indicates negative attitudes toward the insanity defence. 
A lower score indicates an endorsement of the insanity defence, or a belief that the defence is working 
for those who need it and is not likely to be abused. 
Comments: 
The purpose of the Insanity Defence Attitudes Scale - Revised is to provide a psychometrically sound 
assessment of potential jurors' attitudes toward the insanity defence and to possibly provide attorneys 
with a useful tool to use during the voir dire process. 
For the original Insanity Defence Scale, see: Skeem, J.L., & Golding, S.L. (2001). Describing jurors' 
personal conceptions of insanity and their relationship to case judgements. Psychology, Public Policy 
and Law, 7, 561 -621 . 
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